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Abstract
This paper introduces endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with environ-
mental constraints and limited resources. A unique ￿nal good is produced by combining inputs from
two sectors. One of these sectors uses ￿dirty￿machines and thus creates environmental degradation.
Research can be directed to improving the technology of machines in either sector. We characterize
dynamic tax policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare, as a function of
structural characteristics of the economy, in particular the degree of substitutability between clean and
dirty inputs, environmental and resource stocks, and cross-country technological spillovers. First, we
￿nd that factoring in directed technical change: (i) increases the cost of delaying intervention, particu-
larly when the inputs are highly substitutable; (ii) calls for the use of pro￿t taxes or other instruments to
direct innovation, in addition to the input (carbon) tax emphasized in the literature. Second, we show
that: (i) in the case where the inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable, sustainable long-run growth can be
achieved with temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production; (ii) the sooner and the stronger
is the policy response, the shorter is the slow growth transition phase; (iii) the use of an exhaustible
resource in dirty input production helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire when the two
inputs are substitutes. Third, we ￿nd that under reasonable parameter values (corresponding to those
used in existing models with exogenous technology) and with su¢ cient substitutability between inputs,
it is optimal to redirect technical change towards clean technologies immediately. Finally, in a two-
country extension of the baseline model where: (a) the two inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable in both
countries; (b) dirty input production in both countries depletes the global environmental stock; (c) the
South imitates technologies invented in the North, we show that taxing dirty innovation and production
in the North only may be su¢ cient to avoid a global disaster, but international trade increases the need
for global policy coordination.
JEL Classi￿cation: O30, O31, O33, C65.
Keywords: environment, exhaustible resources, directed technological change, innovation.
Work in Progress. Comments Welcome.
￿MIT and NBER
yHarvard and NBER
zHarvard
xHarvard1 Introduction
How to control and limit climate change caused by our growing consumption of fossil fuels and
to develop alternative energy sources to these fossil fuels are among the most pressing policy
challenges facing the world today. While climate scientists have focused on various aspects of
the damage that our current energy consumption causes to the environment,1 economists have
emphasized both the bene￿ts￿ in terms of limiting environmental degradation￿ and costs￿ in
terms of reducing economic growth￿ of di⁄erent policy proposals. More importantly, while a
large part of the discussion among climate scientists focuses on the e⁄ect of various policies
on the development of alternative￿ and more ￿environmentally friendly￿ ￿ energy sources, the
response of technological change to environmental policy has until very recently been all but
ignored by leading economic analyses of environment policy, which have mostly focused on
computable general equilibrium models with exogenous technology.2 This omission is despite
the fact that existing empirical evidence indicates that changes in the relative price of energy
inputs have an important e⁄ect on the types of technologies that are developed and adopted.
For example, Newell, Ja⁄e and Stavins (1999) show that between 1960 and 1980, when energy
prices were stable, innovations in air-conditioning have reduced the prices faced by consumers
following the oil price hikes, these air conditioners became more energy e¢ cient. Popp (2002)
provides more systematic evidence on the same point by using patent data from 1970 to 1994;
he documents the impact of energy prices on patents for energy-saving innovations.3
This paper is motivated by our belief that a satisfactory framework for the study of the
costs and bene￿ts of di⁄erent environmental policies must include, at its centerpiece, the en-
dogenous response of di⁄erent types of technologies to proposed policies. Our purpose is to
take a ￿rst step towards the development of such a framework. We propose a simple two-sector
model of directed technical change. The unique ￿nal good is produced by combining the inputs
produced by these two sectors. One of them uses ￿dirty￿machines and creates environmen-
tal degradation. Pro￿t-maximizing researchers build on previous innovations (￿build on the
shoulders of giants￿ ) and direct their research to improving the quality of machines in one or
the other sector. We ￿rst focus on a single (and closed) economy.
Our framework highlights the central roles played by the market size and the price e⁄ects on
the direction of technical change (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002).4 The market size e⁄ect encourages
innovation towards the larger input sector, while the price e⁄ect makes innovation directed
1See, for instance, Stott et al. (2004) on the contribution of human activity to the European heatwave of
2003, Emanuel (2005) and Landsea (2005) on the increased impact and destructiveness of tropical cyclones and
Atlantic hurricanes over the last decades, and Nicholls and Lowe (2006) on sea-level rise.
2See, e.g., Nordhaus (1994), MacCracken et al. (1999), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
3Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) provide evidence from the health-care sector, suggesting that capital
investments and technology adoption are highly responsive to changes in relative prices caused by regulation.
4In addition, we will see that what is referred to as ￿state dependence￿in Acemoglu (2002), where current
research builds on past research in the same sector, plays an important role here.
1towards the sector with higher price. The relative magnitudes of these e⁄ects in our framework
are, in turn, determined by three factors:
1. The elasticity of substitution between the two sectors.
2. The relative levels of development of the technologies of the two sectors.
3. Whether dirty inputs are produced using an exhaustible resource.
Because of the environmental externality, the decentralized equilibrium is not optimal.
Moreover, the laissez-faire equilibrium typically leads to an ￿environmental disaster,￿where
the quality of the environment falls below a critical threshold (the most important exception
to this case is when the dirty input uses an exhaustible resource, in which case pro￿t incentives
in the laissez-faire equilibrium may be su¢ cient to prevent such an environmental disaster).
More interesting are the results on what types of policies can prevent such disasters and
how costly delaying their introduction is. These also depend on the market size and price
e⁄ects, and thus on the three factors highlighted above. When the two sectors (clean and dirty
inputs) are highly substitutable (￿strong substitutes￿ ), the economy rapidly heads towards an
environmental disaster. Broadly speaking, in this case directed technical change, in particular
the market size e⁄ect, implies that an initial productivity advantage in dirty inputs will induce
researchers to target innovation to these machines (as the expected pro￿t from innovating in
a sector is increasing in employment and productivity in this sector) despite the price e⁄ect
(i.e., the fact that the use of the more productive dirty machines also results in a lower relative
price of the dirty input). However, a temporary policy intervention (for example, a temporary
tax on the use of dirty inputs, reminiscent to a carbon tax, or simply a pro￿t tax in dirty
sectors/subsidy on clean innovation) may be su¢ cient prevent an environmental disaster when
the two sectors are highly substitutable. Such a temporary intervention would redirect technical
change, meaning that it would induce research (and production) to shift away from the dirty
input. Once the clean inputs become developed, the tax is no longer required. But this case
also highlights that delaying the introduction of such policies is potentially quite costly; delay
would increase the gap between clean and dirty sectors and thus call for higher taxes (and for
more extended slowdown in the economy) in the future in order to avoid a disaster.5
In contrast, when the two sectors are not su¢ ciently substitutable, an environmental dis-
aster develops less rapidly (and depending on the speci￿cation of environmental dynamics may
also be less likely) in the laissez-faire equilibrium, since in that case the price e⁄ect dominates
5The costs of delay and the need for rapid and decisive action in our framework (with su¢ cient substitutabil-
ity) contrast sharply with existing policy recommendations from computable general equilibrium models with
exogenous technology discussed below, which suggest that policy should be gradual. We return to this issue in
greater detail in subsection 2.4.3.
2and the initial productivity advantage in dirty machines induces innovation in the more back-
ward, clean sector. But preventing such a disaster now requires a permanent policy intervention
(because it is now impossible to switch research permanently to the clean sector).
In addition to showing how simple policy interventions can prevent environmental disasters,
we also use this framework to characterize the structure of optimal environmental regulation.
We show that optimal regulation involves the use of both input taxes (such as the carbon
tax) and pro￿t taxes on the dirty sector (or equivalently, research subsidies to clean research).
Even though input taxes both discourage polluting activities and make research in the clean
sector more pro￿table, sole reliance on input (carbon) taxes would cause excessive production
distortions in the short run. The use of pro￿t taxes lessens this reliance on, and the short-
run negative e⁄ects of, input taxes. We also show that when dirty and clean inputs are
strong substitutes, optimal environmental regulation involves pro￿t and input taxes only for
a temporary period, similar to the temporary use of pro￿t taxes for avoiding environmental
disasters. This is again thanks to the fact that when clean inputs become su¢ ciently advanced,
both research and production switch to that sector. In contrast, with lesser substitutability
between the two sectors, optimal environmental regulation involves permanent input and pro￿t
taxes.
As a ￿rst step towards a more careful quantitative analysis of environmental policy in the
presence of directed technical change, we also perform a simple calibration exercise. We relate
our environmental quality variable to temperature and atmospheric concentration of carbon.
We choose a parametrization such that the costs of small increases in temperature are compara-
ble to those obtained in Nordhaus￿ s DICE 2007 model. Given such a parametrization, we ￿nd
that, in the presence of directed technical change, for high (but reasonable) elasticities of sub-
stitution between clean and dirty inputs (nonfossil and fossil fuels), the optimal policy involves
an immediate switch of all R&D e⁄ort to clean technologies (but with our baseline elasticity, it
takes about seven decades for 90% of production to switch to clean technologies). Interestingly,
the general quantitative structure of optimal environmental policy appears broadly robust to
whether one uses a low or medium discount rate (which is the main source of the di⁄erent
conclusions on optimal environmental policy in the Stern report or in Nordhaus￿ s research).
The degree of substitution, which plays a central role in the model, has a clear empirical
counterpart. For example, renewable energy, provided it can be stored and transported ef-
￿ciently would be highly substitutable with energy derived from fossil fuels. This reasoning
would suggest a (very) high degree of substitution between dirty and clean inputs, since the
same production services can be obtained from alternative energy with less pollution. In con-
trast, if the ￿clean alternative￿were to reduce our consumption of energy permanently, for
example by using less e⁄ective transport technologies, this would correspond to a low degree
of substitution, since greater consumption of non-energy commodities would increase the de-
3mand for energy. Moreover, this parameter, though not systematically investigated by existing
research, can be estimated in future empirical work and should become a crucial input into
the design of environmental policy.
Our framework also clearly illustrates the e⁄ects of exhaustibility of resources on the laissez-
faire equilibrium and on the structure of optimal policy. An environmental disaster is less likely
when the dirty sector uses an exhaustible resource (and the two sectors have a high degree
of substitution), since this will create a tendency for its costs to increase as this resource is
depleted. The greater cost of the resource will induce an increase in the price and a relative
contraction in the size of the dirty sector. With a high elasticity between the two inputs, the
market size e⁄ect then encourages innovation directed towards the clean sector, even without
government intervention, potentially avoiding an environmental disaster. The contrast between
exhaustible and non-exhaustible resources in the model also has a clear empirical counterpart.
Finally, our framework can be used to analyze issues of global environmental policy coordi-
nation in a multi-country setting. Key questions in this case include: (i) whether environmental
degradation (and in the extreme case, a disaster) can be avoided by policies in the ￿North￿
alone, that is, without global policy coordination imposing similar environmental regulations
in the South, (i.e., in developing countries such as India and China); (ii) what the e⁄ects of
international trade are on the development of environmental technologies and on sustainability.
Our framework provides new answers to these questions. Again, the three factors emphasized
above turn out to be central. When the two sectors are highly substitutable (and there are
international technology linkages), environmental regulation only in the North can be su¢ -
cient to stave o⁄ an environmental disaster, because once these policies induce a su¢ cient
improvement in the technology of the clean sector, the South will also adjust its technology
and pattern of production. However, international trade, without global policy coordination,
may lead to increased environmental damage. In particular, it creates a ￿pollution haven￿
in the South, allowing ￿rms there to specialize in, and increase the production of, the dirty
inputs, which is not taxed there. This increases the need for global policy coordination for
avoiding an environmental disaster.
Our paper relates to the substantial and growing literature on growth, resources, and the
environment. Nordhaus￿ s (1994) pioneering study proposed a dynamic integrated model of
climate change and the economy (the DICE model), which extends the neoclassical Ramsey
model with equations representing geophysical relationships (emissions equations, concentra-
tions equations, climate-change equations, climate-damage equations), and their interactions
with economic outcomes.6 Recent work by Golosov, Hassler, Krusell and Tsyvinski (2009)
6Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) extend the DICE model to include eight regions making decisions independently
(the ￿RICE￿ model, or Regional Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy). The analysis of
economic activity and its consequences in terms of climate change using this type of approach has been the
subject of an extensive report conducted by Stern (2006).
4characterizes the structure of optimal policies in a related model with exogenous technology
and exhaustible resources. In our calibration exercise we build on Nordhaus￿ s study and results.
There is also a growing literature focusing on climate￿ s impact on di⁄erent types of outcomes,
such as health, agriculture, con￿ ict, and economic growth.7 Another branch of the literature
focuses on the measurement of the costs of climate change, particularly stressing issues related
to risk, uncertainty and discounting.8 Based on the assessment of discounting and related
issues, this literature has prescribed either decisive and immediate governmental action (for
example, Stern, 2006) or a more gradualist approach, with modest control in the short-run fol-
lowed by sharper emissions reduction in the medium and the long run.9 Finally, some authors
have built on Weitzman (1974)￿ s analysis on the use of price or quantity instruments to study
climate change policy and the choice between taxes and quotas.10
The response of technology to environmental degradation and environmental policy, our
main focus in this paper, has received much less attention in the economics literature, however.
Early work by Stokey (1998) highlighted the tension between growth and the environment, and
showed that degradation of the environment can create an endogenous limit to growth. Aghion
and Howitt (1998, Chapter 5) introduced environmental constraints in a Schumpeterian growth
model and emphasized that environmental constraints may not prevent sustainable long-run
growth when environment-saving innovations are allowed. Neither of these early contributions
allowed technological change to be directed to clean or dirty technologies.11
Subsequent work by Popp (2004) allowed for directed innovation in the energy sector.12
Popp presents a calibration exercise and establishes that models that ignore the directed tech-
nical change e⁄ects can signi￿cantly overstate the cost of environmental regulation. While
Popp￿ s work is highly complementary to ours, neither his work nor others develop a system-
atic framework for the analysis of the impact of environmental regulations on the direction of
7See, for example, Deschenes and Moretti (2007), Sachs and Malaney (2002), Deschenes and Greenstone
(2007), Miguel et al. (2004), and Dell et al. (2008).
8For example, Stern (2006), Weitzman (2007, 2008), Dasgupta (2007, 2008), Nordhaus (2007), von Below
and Persson (2008), Mendelsohn (2007), and Tol and Yohe (2006).
9See, for example, the work by Nordhaus and coauthors (1994, 2000, 2002). A survey of the results of
greenhouse-gas stabilization policy in several climate-change models can be found in Energy Modeling Forum
Study 19 (2004).
10See for example Hepburn (2006) and Pizer (2002). In addition, several studies address the importance
of internationally coordinated policy, such as Stern (2006) and Watson (2001). Aldy et al. (2003) provide a
comparison of the di⁄erent architectures for global climate policy.
11First attempts at introducing endogenous directed technical change in models of growth and the environment
also build on Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and include Grubler and Messner (1998), Manne and Richels (2002),
Messner (1997), Buonanno et al (2003), Nordhaus (2002), Sue Wing (2003), and Di Maria and Valente (2006),
and more closely related to the model here, Aghion and Howitt (2009, Chapter 16).
12Nordhaus (2002) also extends the R&DICE model by including a simple form of induced technical change.
In particular, he uses a variant of his previous framework with ￿xed proportions, in which R&D is modeled as
shifting the minimum level of carbon/energy inputs required for production. However, since factor substitution
is not allowed in the model, it is not possible to compare the role of induced innovation with that of factor
substitution in reducing greenhouse emissions. Popp￿ s (2004) ENTICE model allows for both endogenous
technological change and factor substitution.
5technological change. We develop a general and tractable framework, extending the models in
Acemoglu (1998, 2002), that allows us: (i) to perform systematic comparative analyses for the
e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of policies on innovation, growth and environmental resources both
with and without directed technical change; (ii) to study the implications of dirty inputs using
exhaustible resources; (iii) to characterize dynamic optimal policy; and (iv) to study the role
of international linkages in technology and trade on the e⁄ects of environmental regulations.
More recently, Gans (2009) develops a two-period model based on Acemoglu (2009b) to
discuss the Porter hypothesis, that environmental regulation can lead to faster technological
progress (see also Rauscher, 2009). In particular he shows that this would require a high degree
of substitutability between clean and dirty inputs. We abstract from this channel in the current
paper by assuming that the total R&D resources in the economy are constant, focusing instead
on long-run growth sustainability and the characterization of dynamic optimal policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our basic frame-
work without exhaustible resources and presents the majority of our main results. In particular,
it characterizes the laissez-faire equilibrium and shows how this can lead to an environmental
disaster. It then shows how simple policy interventions can prevent environmental disasters and
clari￿es the role of directed technical change in these results. Finally, this section characterizes
the structure of optimal environmental policy in this setup and also provides a preliminary
quantitative assessment of how directed technical change a⁄ects the structure of optimal policy
under reasonable parameter values. Section 3 introduces exhaustible resources and shows how
this changes the conclusions from Section 2. Section 4 discusses issues of global policy using
a two-country case extension. Section 5 concludes, while the appendices contain the proofs of
several results stated in the text.
2 Baseline Model: Non-Exhaustible Resource
In this section, we introduce the baseline framework (without an exhaustible resource). We
identify the market size and price e⁄ects on the direction of technical change and characterize
the equilibrium of the economy under laissez-faire. We then discuss how policy interventions
may be necessary to avoid ￿environmental disasters￿ , and the costs of delayed intervention.
Finally, we fully characterize the optimal policy in this environment and provide a ￿rst attempt
at a simple calibration to understand how the presence of directed technical change a⁄ects the
structure of optimal policy under reasonable parameter values.
2.1 Preferences, Production and the Environment
We consider an in￿nite horizon discrete time economy inhabited by a continuum of households
of mass 1 (making up the workers, entrepreneurs and scientists). We assume that all households
6have preferences (or that the economy admits a representative household with preferences):
1 X
t=0
1
(1 + ￿)
tu(Ct;St) (1)
where Ct is consumption of the unique ￿nal good at time t, St denotes the quality of the
environment at time t; and ￿ > 0 is the discount rate. We assume that St 2 [0; ￿ S], where ￿ S is
the quality of the environment absent any human pollution, and to simplify the notation, we
also assume that it is the initial level of quality, that is, S0 = ￿ S.
The instantaneous utility function u(C;S) is increasing both in C and S, twice di⁄eren-
tiable and jointly concave in (C;S). Moreover, we impose the following Inada-type conditions:
lim
C#0
@u(C;S)
@C
= 1, lim
S#0
@u(C;S)
@S
= 1, and lim
S#0
u(C;S) = ￿1: (2)
The last two conditions imply that the quality of the environment reaching its lower bound
has severe utility consequences.13 Finally we assume that
lim
S"￿ S
@u
￿
C; ￿ S
￿
@S
￿
@u
￿
C; ￿ S
￿
@S
= 0; (3)
which implies that as S approaches ￿ S, the value of the marginal increase in environmental
quality is small. This assumption is adopted to simplify the characterization of optimal envi-
ronmental policy in subsection 2.4, and we discuss below how relaxing it a⁄ects the results.
There is a unique ￿nal good, produced competitively from the output of two intermediate
sectors, according to the aggregate production function
Yt =
￿
Y
"￿1
"
ct + Y
"￿1
"
dt
￿ "
"￿1
; (4)
where " 2 (0;+1) is the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors. Throughout, we
say that the two sectors are (gross) substitutes when " > 1 and (gross) complements when
" < 1.14 The case of substitutes " > 1 (in fact, and elasticity of substitution signi￿cantly
greater than 1) appears as the more empirically relevant benchmark, since we would expect
successful clean technologies to substitute for the functions of dirty technologies. Nevertheless,
since the relevant elasticity of substitution has not yet been carefully estimated, and because
13Alternatively, the negative consequences of environmental degradation could have been incorporated into
the production structure with equivalent results.
14As mentioned in the Introduction, renewable energy that can be stored and transported e¢ ciently would
correspond to a high degree of substitution between dirty and clean inputs, since the same production services
can be obtained from alternative energy with less pollution. Similarly, cars using gasoline versus cars using
clean energy sources would be examples of highly substitutable dirty and clean inputs. In contrast, if ￿clean
alternatives￿involved reductions in our consumption of energy or transportation services, this would correspond
to a low degree of substitution. Similarly, if ￿green cars￿were produced using components that are required
other dirty inputs, the relevant elasticity of substitutability between clean and dirty sectors would be smaller.
7the case of complements both highlights a variety of di⁄erent and novel economic forces and
is theoretically interesting, throughout we discuss both cases, though we place more emphasis
on the case of substitutes.
Both Yct and Ydt are produced using labor and a continuum of sector-speci￿c machines
(intermediates) according to the production functions
Yct = L1￿￿
ct
Z 1
0
A1￿￿
cit x￿
citdi and Ydt = L1￿￿
dt
Z 1
0
A1￿￿
dit x￿
ditdi; (5)
where ￿ 2 (0;1), Ajit is the quality of machine of type i used in sector j 2 fc;dg at time t
and xjit is the quantity of this machine. This setup is similar to Acemoglu (1998), except that
employment in the two sectors is endogenously determined and the distribution parameters
have been dropped in (4) to simplify the algebra. We also de￿ne
Ajt ￿
Z 1
0
Ajitdi (6)
as the aggregate productivity in sector j 2 fc;dg.
Market clearing for labor requires that
Lct + Ldt ￿ 1: (7)
In line with the literature on endogenous technical change, machines (for both sectors) are
supplied by monopolistically competitive ￿rms. Regardless of the quality of machines and of
the sector for which they are designed, producing one unit of any machine costs   units of the
￿nal good. Without loss of generality, we normalize   ￿ ￿2.
We also normalize the measure of scientists s to 1. The technology of innovation is as
follows. At the beginning of every period, each scientist decides whether to direct her research
to clean or dirty technology. She is then randomly allocated to at most one machine (without
any congestion; so that each machine is also allocated to at most one scientist) and is successful
in innovation with probability ￿j 2 (0;1) in sector j 2 fc;dg, where innovation increases the
quality of a machine by a factor 1 + ￿ (with ￿ > 0, i.e., from Ajit to (1 + ￿)Ajit).15 A
successful scientist (who has invented a better version of machine i in sector j 2 fc;dg) obtains
a one-period patent and becomes the entrepreneur for the current period in the production
of machine i. In sectors where innovation was not successful, monopoly rights are allocated
randomly to an entrepreneur drawn from a pool of potential entrepreneurs who can use the old
15Our model therefore imposes that all technical change takes a ￿factor-augmenting￿form, increasing Act or
Adt. In practice, non-factor-augmenting improvements are also possible, though more di¢ cult to incorporate
into a growth model. Acemoglu (2007) provides a comprehensive analysis of the endogenous bias of technology in
response to changes in factor supplies without restricting productivity improvements to take a factor-augmenting
form.
8technology.16 This technology for innovation where scientists can only target a sector (rather
than a speci￿c machine) ensures that scientists are allocated across the di⁄erent machines in
a sector.17 We denote the mass of scientists working on machines in sector j 2 fc;dg at time
t by sjt, and thus market clearing for scientists takes the form
sct + sdt ￿ 1: (8)
Finally, the quality of the environment, St, evolves according to the di⁄erence equation.
St+1 = max
￿
min
￿
￿￿Ydt + (1 + ￿)St; ￿ S
￿
;0
￿
; (9)
where ￿ measures the rate of environmental degradation resulting from the production of dirty
inputs, and ￿ is the rate of ￿environmental regeneration￿ . Recall that ￿ S is the maximum level
of environmental quality corresponding to zero pollution. This equation introduces the major
externality in our model, from the production of the dirty input to environmental degradation.
Note that if St = 0, then S￿ will remain at 0 for all ￿ > t.
While other papers in the environment literature typically use more detailed descriptions
of environmental dynamics, in this paper we take a more ￿reduced-form￿approach and con-
centrate instead on identifying the new economic forces that arise in the presence of directed
technical change. Nevertheless, the above dynamic equation is meant to capture basic features
of the real process of environmental change. First, we assume an exponential regeneration rate
￿ because greater environmental degradation is typically presumed to lower the regeneration
capacity of the globe. For example, part of the carbon in the atmosphere is absorbed by the
ice cap; as the ice cap melts because of global warming, more carbon is released into the at-
mosphere and the melting of the ice cap decreases the albedo of the planet further contributing
to global warming. Similarly, the depletion of forests reduces carbon absorption, contributing
further to global warming. Second, as already mentioned above, the upper bound ￿ S captures
the idea that environmental degradation results from pollution, and that pollution cannot be
negative. We discuss below how our results change if there is no upper bound on environmental
quality (i.e., ￿ S = 1) and under alternative laws of motion for the quality of the environment.
16As highlighted further by equation (15) below, this structure implies that innovation builds on the existing
level of quality of a machine, and thus incorporates the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿feature. In terms of
the framework in Acemoglu (2002), this implies that there is ￿state dependence￿in the innovation possibilities
frontier, in the sense that advances in one sector make future advances in that sector more pro￿table or more
e⁄ective. This is a natural feature in the current context, since improvements in fossil fuel technology should
not (and in practice do not) directly translate into innovations in alternative and renewable energy sources.
Nevertheless, one could allow some spillovers between the two sectors, that is, ￿limited state dependence￿as in
Acemoglu (2002), and this would not change our qualitative results.
17The assumptions here are adopted to simplify the exposition and mimic the structure of equilibrium in
continuous time models (see, for example, Acemoglu, 2002 or Aghion and Howitt, 2009). We adopt a discrete
time setup throughout to simplify the analysis of dynamics. Appendix J shows that the qualitative results are
identical in an alternative formulation with patents and free entry (instead of monopoly rights being allocated
to entrepreneurs).
92.2 Laissez-faire equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize the laissez-faire equilibrium outcome, that is, the decen-
tralized equilibrium without any policy intervention. We ￿rst characterize the equilibrium
production and labor decisions for given productivity parameters. We then analyze the direc-
tion of technical change.
An equilibrium is given by sequences of wages (wt), prices for inputs (pjt), prices for ma-
chines (pjit), demands for machines (xjit), demands for inputs (Yjt), labor demands (Ljt) by
input producers j 2 fc;dg, research allocations (sdt;sct), and quality of environment (St) such
that, in each period t: (i) (pjit;xjit) maximizes pro￿ts by the producer of machine i in sector j;
(ii) Ljt maximizes pro￿ts by producers of input j; (iii) Yjt maximizes the pro￿ts of ￿nal good
producers; (iv) (sdt;sct) maximizes the expected pro￿t of a researcher at date t; (v) the wage
wt and the prices pjt clear the labor and input markets respectively; and (vi) the evolution of
St is given by (9).
To simplify the algebra and the notation, we de￿ne ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") and impose the
following assumption, which is adopted throughout the text (often without explicitly specifying
it).
Assumption 1
Ac0
Ad0
< min
 
(1 + ￿￿c)
￿
’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
;(1 + ￿￿d)
’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
!
:
This assumption imposes the reasonable condition that initially the clean sector is su¢ -
ciently backward relative to the dirty (fossil fuel) sector, so that under laissez-faire and with
" > 1, the economy starts innovating in the dirty sector. This assumption enables us to focus
on the more relevant part of the parameter space (see Appendix A for the case in which this
assumption does not hold).
2.2.1 Laissez-faire equilibrium given technologies
We ￿rst consider the equilibrium at time t given technology levels Acit and Adit. For this
particular part we drop the subscripts t.
As the ￿nal good is produced competitively the ratio of relative price satis￿es
pc
pd
=
￿
Yc
Yd
￿￿ 1
"
: (10)
This equation implies that the relative price of clean inputs (compared to dirty inputs) is
decreasing in their relative supply, and moreover, the elasticity of the relative price response is
the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. Our normalization of the
10￿nal good price at 1 then also implies that
￿
p1￿"
c + p1￿"
d
￿1=(1￿")
= 1:
The pro￿t-maximization problem of the producer of machine i in sector j 2 fc;dg can be
written as
max
xji;Lj
￿
pjL1￿￿
j
Z 1
0
A1￿￿
ji x￿
jidi ￿ wLj ￿
Z 1
0
pjixjidi
￿
;
and leads to the following iso-elastic inverse demand curve:
xij =
￿
￿pj
pji
￿￿ 1
1￿￿
AjiLji: (11)
Thus the demand for machines i in sector j increases with the price pj of input j and with
employment Lj in that sector, since both increase the pro￿tability of all machines used in that
sector, encouraging producers to use more of each. It is also increasing in the quality of such
machines, Aji, and decreasing in their price, pji.
The monopolist producer of machine i in sector j chooses pji and xji so as to maximize
pro￿ts ￿ji = (pji ￿  )xji, subject to the inverse demand curve (11). Given this iso-elastic
demand, the pro￿t-maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal cost, thus pji =  =￿.
Recalling the normalization   ￿ ￿2, this implies that pji = ￿ and thus the equilibrium demand
for machines i in sector j is obtained as
xji = p
1
1￿￿
j LjAji: (12)
Equilibrium pro￿ts for the monopolist are then given by
￿ji = (1 ￿ ￿)￿p
1
1￿￿
j LjAji: (13)
Next combining equation (12) with the ￿rst-order condition with respect to labor,
(1 ￿ ￿)pjL￿￿
j
Z 1
0
A1￿￿
ji x￿
jidi = w and using (6) gives the relative prices of clean and dirty inputs
as
pc
pd
=
￿
Ac
Ad
￿￿(1￿￿)
: (14)
This equation formalizes the natural idea that the input produced with more productive ma-
chines will be relatively cheaper.
2.2.2 Laissez-faire equilibrium: directed innovation
We next endogeneize productivity by linking productivity growth to R&D in clean and dirty
technologies (for clarity, we now reintroduce the time subscripts t).
If a scientist succeeds in innovation, she discovers a new machine that is (1 + ￿) times
more productive than its previous vintage, Ajit￿1. Therefore, denoting the mass of scientists
11directing their e⁄ort to sector j by sjt; and recalling that scientists targeting sector j are
randomly allocated across machines in that sector, the average productivity in sector j at time
t evolves over time according to the di⁄erence equation
Ajt =
￿
1 + ￿￿jsjt
￿
Ajt￿1: (15)
To determine the evolution of average productivities in the two sectors, we need to char-
acterize the pro￿tability of research in these sectors, which will determine the direction of
technical change. Taking into account the probability of success, the expected pro￿t ￿jt for a
scientist engaging in research in sector j is
￿jt = ￿j
Z 1
0
(1 ￿ ￿)￿p
1
1￿￿
jt Ljt (1 + ￿)Ajit￿1di
= ￿j (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿p
1
1￿￿
jt LjtAjt￿1; (16)
where the second line simply uses (6). Consequently, the relative bene￿t from undertaking
research in sector c relative to sector d is governed by the ratio:
￿ct
￿dt
=
￿c
￿d
￿
￿
pct
pdt
￿ 1
1￿￿
| {z }
price e⁄ect
￿
Lct
Ldt |{z}
market size e⁄ect
￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1 | {z }
direct productivity e⁄ect
: (17)
When this ratio is higher, R&D directed towards the clean technologies becomes more prof-
itable.
Thus a scientist￿ s incentive to innovate in the clean versus the dirty sector machines is
shaped by three forces: (i) the direct productivity e⁄ect (captured by the term Act=Adt), which
pushes towards innovating in the sector with higher productivity; this force results from the
presence of the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿e⁄ect highlighted in (15); (ii) the price
e⁄ect (captured by the term (pct=pdt)
1
1￿￿), encouraging innovation towards the sector with
higher prices, which from (14) is the relatively backward sector; (iii) the market size e⁄ect
(captured by the term Lct=Ldt), encouraging innovation in the sector with greater employ-
ment, which has the larger market for machines. Which sector has greater employment and a
larger market is in turn determined by relative productivities and the elasticity of substitution
between the two inputs. The more substitutable the two inputs are, the more important is the
market size e⁄ect compared to the price e⁄ect.
Next, combining (12) with (5), gives the equilibrium production level of input j as
Yjt = (pjt)
￿
1￿￿ AjtLjt: (18)
Now combining (18) with (10), then using (14) and the de￿nition of ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ "), we
obtain the relationship between relative productivities and relative employment as:
Lct
Ldt
=
￿
pct
pdt
￿￿
’￿1
1￿￿ Adt
Act
=
￿
Act
Adt
￿￿’
: (19)
12Thus the market size e⁄ect creates a force towards innovation in the more backward sector
when " < 1, and in the more advanced sector when " > 1. More speci￿cally, combining (14),
(17) and (19), we obtain
￿ct
￿dt
=
￿c
￿d
￿
1 + ￿￿csct
1 + ￿￿dsdt
￿￿’￿1 ￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
; (20)
which yields the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In the laissez-faire equilibrium, innovation at time t occurs in the clean sector only
when ￿cA
￿’
ct￿1 > ￿d (1 + ￿￿c)
’+1 A
￿’
dt￿1, in the dirty sector only when ￿c (1 + ￿￿d)
’+1 A
￿’
ct￿1 <
￿dA
￿’
dt￿1, and can occur in both sectors when ￿c (1 + ￿￿dsdt)
’+1 A
￿’
ct￿1 = ￿d (1 + ￿￿csct)
’+1 A
￿’
dt￿1.
Proof. See Appendix A, where we also present a complete characterization of the equilib-
rium allocations of scientists and equilibrium innovation.
The notable conclusion of this lemma is that innovation will favor the more advanced sector
when " > 1. In particular, in this case ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") < 0, and the direct productivity
and market size e⁄ects are stronger than the price e⁄ect. In contrast, when " < 1, innovation
will favor the less advanced sector because ’ > 0 (and the direct productivity e⁄ect is weaker
than the price e⁄ect and the market size e⁄ect, which now reinforce each other). Using Lemma
1 we can establish:
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique laissez-faire equilib-
rium, which takes the following form:
￿ If " > 1, innovation always occurs in the dirty sector only.
￿ If " < 1, innovation ￿rst occurs in the clean sector and subsequently occurs in both sectors.
The share of scientists devoted to the clean sector in the long run is sc = ￿d=(￿c + ￿d).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for this proposition follows from Lemma 1. When the two inputs are sub-
stitutes (" > 1), innovation starts in the dirty sector, which is more advanced initially (As-
sumption 1). This increases the gap between the dirty and the clean sectors, and the initial
pattern of equilibrium is reinforced. In contrast, in the empirically less relevant but theoreti-
cally interesting case where the two inputs are complements (" < 1), the price e⁄ect dominates
and innovation initially takes place in the more backward￿ in this case, the clean￿ sector.
This reduces the technology gap between the two sectors and ultimately the equilibrium must
involve innovation in both sectors; in particular, the share of scientists allocated to the clean
sector converges towards sc = ￿c=(￿c + ￿d), which ensures that both sectors grow at the same
rate (see Appendix B). In particular, in this case average quality levels in both sectors, Ac and
Ad, grow at the same asymptotic rate ￿e ￿, where e ￿ ￿ ￿c￿d=(￿c + ￿d)￿ see next subsection.
132.3 Directed technical change and environmental disasters
A major concern by climate scientists is that the environment may deteriorate so much that
it reaches a ￿point of no return￿ . In our environment equation (9), this notion is captured
by the fact that if environmental quality St reaches 0 in ￿nite time, it remains at 0 forever
thereafter. Motivated by this feature, we de￿ne the notion of environmental disaster, which
will be useful for developing the main intuitions implied by our framework, before we provide
a more complete characterization of optimal environmental policy.
De￿nition 1 An environmental disaster occurs if St = 0 for some t < 1.
Our assumptions on the utility function, in particular, that u(C;0) = ￿1, imply that an
environmental disaster cannot be part of a welfare-maximizing allocation (for any ￿ < 1). In
this subsection, we focus on how a simple policy of ￿redirecting technical change￿can avoid
an environmental disaster (when it would otherwise take place in the laissez-faire equilibrium).
We will then highlight the role of directed technical change by comparing the results to a model
in which scientists cannot direct their research to di⁄erent sectors.
2.3.1 Disaster in the laissez-faire equilibrium
Output of the two inputs and the ￿nal good in the laissez-faire equilibrium can be written as
(again dropping time subscripts to simplify notation):
Yct =
￿
A
’
ct + A
’
dt
￿￿
￿+’
’ ActA
￿+’
dt , Ydt =
￿
A
’
ct + A
’
dt
￿￿
￿+’
’ A
￿+’
ct Adt, (21)
and Yt =
￿
A
’
ct + A
’
dt
￿￿ 1
’ ActAdt:
These expressions, together with Proposition 1, imply that in the long-run, dirty input produc-
tion will grow without bound (when " > 1, the long-run growth rate of dirty input production
is ￿￿d, while it is ￿e ￿ when " < 1). As a level of production of dirty input greater than
(1 + ￿)￿￿1 ￿ S necessarily leads to a disaster next period, the economy under laissez-faire will
eventually reach a disaster. This establishes (proof omitted):
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the laissez-faire equilibrium always leads
to an environmental disaster.
Although the laissez-faire equilibrium always involves environmental disaster, the expres-
sions in (21) imply that the long-run growth rate of dirty input production in the substitutable
case is ￿￿d, which is greater than its long-run growth rate in the complementarity case, ￿e ￿,
since in the latter case R&D resources are spread across the two sectors. Exploiting this fact,
we can show that for given initial technological levels Ac0 and Ad0; the production of dirty input
is always higher in the substitutability case than in the complementarity case, which in turn
14implies that the disaster occurs sooner in the substitutability case than in the complementarity
case:
Corollary 1 Starting with S0 = ￿ S, an environmental disaster under laissez-faire takes place
sooner when " > 1 than when " < 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
2.3.2 Preventing an environmental disaster using simple policies
Proposition 2 implies that some type of intervention is necessary to avoid a disaster. Suppose
￿rst that the government can impose a pro￿t tax qt on dirty input production, with the
proceeds being redistributed lump-sum to the representative household (which is equivalent
to a subsidy to scientists working on clean inputs with lump-sum taxes). The expected pro￿t
from undertaking research in the dirty sector then becomes
￿dt = (1 ￿ qt)￿d (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿p
1
1￿￿
dt LdtAdt￿1;
while ￿ct is still given by (16). This immediately implies that a su¢ ciently high pro￿t tax can
divert innovation away from the dirty sector.18 Moreover, while this tax is implemented, the
ratio Act=Adt will grow at the rate ￿￿c. The implications of the tax then depend on the degree
of substitutability between the two inputs.
When the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1), a temporary pro￿t tax (maintained for the
necessary number of periods, D) is su¢ cient to redirect all research to the clean sector. More
speci￿cally, while the pro￿t tax is being implemented, the ratio Ac=Ad will increase, and when
it has become su¢ ciently high, it will be pro￿table for scientists to direct their research to
the clean sector even without the tax.19 Then (21) implies that Yd will grow asymptotically
at the same rate as A
￿+’
c . In particular, if " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿) (or ￿ + ’ ￿ 0), Yd will not grow
in the long-run and thus, as long as the initial environmental quality is su¢ ciently high, a
temporary pro￿t tax policy will be su¢ cient to avoid an environmental disaster. In contrast, if
" 2 (1;1=(1 ￿ ￿)) (or ￿+’ > 0), equation (21) implies that even after all research is directed
18In particular, following the analysis in Appendix A, to implement a unique equilibrium where all scientists
direct their research to the clean sector, the pro￿t tax qt must satisfy
qt > 1￿(1 + ￿￿d)
’+1 ￿c
￿d
￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
if " ￿
2 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
and qt ￿ 1￿(1 + ￿￿c)
￿(’+1) ￿c
￿d
￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
if " <
2 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
:
19In particular, the temporary tax needs to be imposed for D periods where D is the smallest integer such
that:
Act+D￿1
Adt+D￿1
> (1 + ￿￿d)
’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
if " ￿
2 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
and
Act+D￿1
Adt+D￿1
￿ (1 + ￿￿c)
￿ ’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
if 1 < " <
2 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
15to the clean sector, Yd will keep growing at rate (1 + ￿￿c)
￿+’ ￿1. The contrast between these
two (strong and weak) substitutability cases is important but also intuitive: ￿rst, since " > 1,
as the average quality of clean machines increases, workers get reallocated towards the clean
sector (which is just the market size e⁄ect); but at the same time the increase of the relative
price of the dirty input over time encourages production of the dirty input (price e⁄ect). Which
of these two forces dominates will depends upon whether " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿) or " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿).20
In the latter case, a temporary tax policy redirecting research to the clean sector will not be
su¢ cient to avoid an environmental disaster.
When the two inputs are complements (" < 1), with or without a temporary pro￿t tax, the
more backward sector always catches up with the more advanced sector in the long run.21 Thus
in the long run, innovation will take place in both sectors, and production of the dirty input
will grow without limit, and consequently, an environmental disaster becomes unavoidable.
This discussion establishes the following proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 3 When the two inputs are strong substitutes (" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)) and ￿ S is su¢ -
ciently high, a temporary pro￿t tax will prevent an environmental disaster. In contrast, when
the two inputs are complements or weak substitute (" < 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), a pro￿t tax cannot prevent
an environmental disaster.
Thus, when the two inputs are strong substitutes, redirecting technical change using a tem-
porary policy intervention can be su¢ cient to avoid a disaster. This shows the importance of
directed technical change: temporary incentives are su¢ cient to induce research to be directed
to clean technologies, and once clean technologies are su¢ ciently advanced, innovation and
production will shift su¢ ciently towards those technologies that environmental disaster can be
avoided without further intervention.
Nevertheless, the policy intervention still has economic costs because during the period of
adjustment (while productivity in the clean sector is catching up with that in the dirty sector),
￿nal output increases more slowly than had innovation been directed towards the dirty sector.
We will study the welfare costs of intervention in subsection 2.4. Before doing this, it is
instructive to look at a simple measure of the (short-run) cost of intervention, de￿ned as the
number of periods T necessary for the economy under the policy intervention to reach the same
20The case where " 2 (1;1=(1 ￿ ￿)) is interesting because even though a simple intervention can ensure
that all research is directed to clean technologies, this is not su¢ cient to prevent growth of the production of
dirty inputs. This is because the rise in the price of dirty inputs encourages an increase in their production
by increasing the use of machines (recall equation (12)). A slightly di⁄erent intuition for this result is that
improvements in the technology of the clean sector also correspond to improvements in the technology of the
￿nal good, which uses them as inputs; the ￿nal good, in turn, is an input for the dirty sector because machines
employed in the sector are produced using the ￿nal good.
21The proof of this claim follows closely the proof of Proposition 1. In particular, regardless of which sector
innovation is ￿rst directed at, innovation in the long run must take place in both sectors, which in turn implies
that the long-run growth rate must be ￿e ￿:
16level of output as it would have done within one period in the absence of the intervention: in
other words, this is the length of the transition period or the number of periods of ￿slow
growth￿in output growth. This measure T (starting at time t) is then the smallest integer
such that:
(1 + ￿￿c)
T
￿
(1 + ￿￿c)
T’ A
’
ct￿1 + A
’
dt￿1
￿ 1
’
￿
(1 + ￿￿d)
￿
A
’
ct￿1 + (1 + ￿￿d)
’ A
’
dt￿1
￿ 1
’
or equivalently,
T =
2
6
6 6
ln
￿￿
(1 + ￿￿d)
￿’ ￿ 1
￿￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿’
+ 1
￿
￿’ln(1 + ￿￿c)
3
7
7 7
(22)
It can be veri￿ed that starting at any t ￿ 1 along the equilibrium path in Proposition 1, we
have T ￿ 1. Thus once innovation is directed towards the clean sector it will take more than
one period for the economy to achieve the same output growth as it would have achieved in
just one period in the equilibrium of Proposition 1 (with innovation still directed at the dirty
sector). The following corollary then follows immediately from equation (22), in particular,
recalling that ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") (proof omitted):
Corollary 2 For Adt￿1=Act￿1 ￿ 1, the short-run cost of intervention, T, is nondecreasing
in the technology gap Adt￿1=Act￿1 and the elasticity of substitution ". Moreover, T increases
more with Adt￿1=Act￿1 when " is greater.
The (short-run) cost of intervention, T, is increasing in Adt￿1=Act￿1 because a larger gap
between the initial quality of dirty and clean machines leads to a longer transition phase,
and thus to a longer period of low growth. In addition, T is also increasing in the elasticity of
substitution ". Intuitively, if the two inputs are close substitutes, ￿nal output production relies
mostly on the more productive input, and therefore, productivity improvement in the clean
sector (taking place during the transition phase) will have less impact on overall productivity
until the clean technologies surpass the dirty ones.
The corollary shows that delayering intervention is costly, not only because of the continued
environmental degradation that will result, but also because during the period of delay Adt=Act
will increase further, and thus when the intervention is eventually implemented, the temporary
pro￿t tax will need to be imposed for longer and there will be a longer period of slow growth
(higher T). This result is clearly related to the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿feature
of the innovation process. Furthermore, the result that the e⁄ects of " and Adt￿1=Act￿1 on T
are complementary implies that delaying the starting date of the intervention is more costly
when the two inputs are more substitutable.
We next illustrate the additional costs created by delayed intervention by computing the
value of T for di⁄erent values of the elasticity of substitution " (in all cases we take " greater
17than 1=(1 ￿ ￿)) and di⁄erent starting dates of intervention.22 We chose the parameters of the
model as follows: we set ￿c = ￿d = 0:025 and ￿ = 1 so that the long-run growth rate ￿￿j is
equal to 2.5% (and therefore time periods correspond to years); we take ￿ = 1=3 (so that the
share of national income spent on machines is approximately equal to the share of capital).
We then compute Act￿1 and Adt￿1 so as that the implied values of Yct￿1 and Ydt￿1 match the
2006 production of nonfossil and fossil fuel in the world primary energy supply (respectively,
19.2% and 80.8% of a total of 11714 Mtoe, International Energy Agency, 2008). Note that
in our exercises here and below, when " varies, Act￿1 and Adt￿1 also need to be adjusted (in
particular, a higher " leads to a higher value of the ratio Act￿1=Adt￿1).23
Using these parameter values, Table 1 shows that T increases rapidly with the delay in
intervention and/or the substitutability between the two inputs (even though as we increase
", we also increase the initial ratio Ac=Ad). Moreover, the increase in T in response to delay is
itself increasing in ".
Table 1: The Cost of Delayed Intervention
(Values of T as a function of delay and ")
delayn" 2 3 5 10
0 3 3 3 4
5 8 8 9 11
10 13 14 16 19
20 23 25 29 37
30 34 37 45 57
Overall, the analysis in this subsection has established that a simple policy intervention
that consists on ￿redirecting￿technical change towards environment friendly technologies can
help prevent an environmental disaster. Our analysis also highlights the idea that delaying
intervention may be quite costly, not only because it further damages the environment (an
e⁄ect already recognized in the climate science literature), but also because it widens the gap
between the dirty and clean technologies, thereby inducing a longer period of catch-up with
slower growth.
2.3.3 Comparison to undirected directed technical change
Here we brie￿ y consider a variant of the model studied so far but without directed technical
change. Our purpose is to highlight how the endogeneity of the direction of technical change
is crucial for the e⁄ects of temporary policy interventions. In particular, consider the same
22We discuss the cost of delayed intervention more systematically in terms of welfare losses in the next section.
23The other parameters of the model do not enter equation (22), hence we do not specify them until the
somewhat more detailed calibration exercise in subsection 2.4.3.
18environment as before, but now suppose that scientists are randomly allocated across sectors
so as to ensure equal growth in the qualities of clean and dirty machines (at the rate ￿e ￿). This
implies that a ￿xed fraction sc = ￿d=(￿c + ￿d) of scientists are always allocated to the clean
sector.24 Consequently, the production of dirty input will always grow at rate ￿e ￿, so that an
environmental disaster will always occur, with or without temporary pro￿t tax.
Note however that in the case where the two inputs are strong substitutes (" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)),
under laissez-faire a disaster will occur sooner with directed technical change than without.
This in turn follows from the fact that for given initial technologies on clean and dirty machines,
all innovation is directed towards the dirty sector. Yet, when the two inputs are strong sub-
stitutes, we also know that with directed technical change a temporary pro￿t tax can redirect
innovations towards the clean sector, thereby preventing an environmental disaster, whereas it
cannot prevent a disaster when technical change is ￿undirected￿ . This establishes the following
proposition further demonstrating the importance of directed technical change in our results
(proof in the text):
Proposition 4 When " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), an environmental disaster under laissez-faire arises
earlier with directed technical change than in the equivalent economy with undirected technical
change. However, provided that ￿ S is su¢ ciently high, a temporary pro￿t tax can prevent an
environmental disaster with directed technical change but not in the equivalent economy with
undirected technical change.
2.3.4 Alternative laws of motion for environmental quality
The directed technical change ideas can be applied with alternative laws of motion. One
possibility is to modify (9) so that there is no upper bound to environmental quality, i.e.,
to set ￿ S = 1 (and set the initial environmental quality at some ￿nite level S0 < 1). This
implies that a disaster can be avoided even if dirty input production grows at a positive rate,
provided that this rate is lower than the regeneration rate of the environment, ￿. Recall
that under laissez-faire the production of dirty input grows at a rate ￿￿d if " > 1 and at a
rate ￿e ￿ if " < 1; moreover, a temporary pro￿t tax can still permanently divert innovation
towards the clean sector when the two inputs are substitutes, so that in the long-run dirty
input production decreases in the strong substitutability case (" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)) and increases at
a rate (1 + ￿￿c)
￿+’ ￿ 1 in the weak substitutability case (1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿)). Consequently,
in this case Proposition 2 and 3 are replaced by the following proposition (proof omitted):
Proposition 5 Suppose that ￿ S = 1. Then, under laissez-faire, there will be an environmental
disaster if the regeneration rate of the environment, ￿, is su¢ ciently low, in particular, if
￿ < ￿￿d when " > 1, and if ￿ < ￿e ￿ when " < 1.
24If we instead assumed that half of the scientists are allocated to the clean sector, the qualitative results
would be similar, though the expressions would become somewhat more complicated.
19When the two inputs are strong substitutes (" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)) and the initial environmental
quality, S0, is su¢ ciently high, a temporary pro￿t tax is su¢ cient to prevent a disaster. When
the two inputs are weak substitutes (1=(1 ￿ ￿) > " > 1) and the initial environmental quality,
S0, is su¢ ciently high, a temporary pro￿t tax can prevent an environmental disaster only if
(1 + ￿￿c)
￿+’ ￿ 1 < ￿. When the two inputs are complements (" < 1), a temporary pro￿t tax
cannot prevent an environmental disaster (i.e., if ￿ < ￿e ￿, an environmental disaster will take
place both under laissez-faire and under a temporary pro￿t tax).
It is also interesting to repeat the comparison to an environment with undirected technical
change with this modi￿ed law of motion. This comparison is also straightforward: recall that
with undirected technical change and " > 1, the laissez-faire growth rate of the production of
the dirty input is ￿e ￿, which is smaller than its long-run growth rate ￿￿d with directed technical
change. This in turn implies that when " > 1 the range of ￿ under which a disaster occurs, for
any initial environmental quality, is larger with directed technical change than without. The
following proposition is the analog of Proposition 4 and states this result (proof omitted):
Proposition 6 Suppose that ￿ S = 1. Then, if " < 1, the range of ￿ for which an environmen-
tal disaster occurs for any initial environmental quality is the same with or without a pro￿t
tax (regardless of whether there is directed technical change). If " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), the range of ￿
for which a disaster occurs under laissez-faire for any initial environmental quality is greater
with directed technical change than without (￿ must be less than ￿￿d with directed technical
change, whereas it must be less than ￿e ￿ without directed technical change). However, a tem-
porary pro￿t tax makes this range become smaller with directed technical change (and prevents
an environmental disaster for su¢ ciently high initial quality when " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), whereas it
has no e⁄ect on this range with undirected technical change.
This proposition therefore shows, perhaps even more clearly than in the case with ￿ S < 1;
that directed technical change is a force towards an environmental disaster under laissez-faire
because it encourages more innovation towards the relatively advanced dirty sector.25 However,
it also becomes a potential powerful remedy for avoiding a disaster because it allows redirecting
technical change when the government uses simple policy interventions.
25This proposition does not cover the case in which 1=(1 ￿ ￿) > " > 1, since with this parameter con￿guration,
the comparison of the likelihood of an environmental disaster with and without directed technical change is
ambiguous. In particular, as the preceding discussion makes it clear, with undirected technical change, an
environmental disaster takes place with or without temporary policy intervention if ￿e ￿ > ￿. In contrast, with
directed technical change, an environmental disaster takes place without policy intervention for the larger set
of parameter values ￿￿d > ￿; but with policy intervention (and a su¢ ciently large initial stock of environmental
quality), it can be prevented if (1 + ￿￿c)
￿+’ ￿1 < ￿, which could be a smaller or larger set of parameter values
than ￿e ￿ < ￿.
20Finally, let us also note that the analysis can also be conducted under another alternative
law of motion of environmental quality,
St+1 = ￿￿Ydt + St + ￿;
where regeneration of the environment is additive rather than proportional to current quality.
With this alternative law of motion, it is straightforward to show that the results are essentially
identical to the baseline formulation because a disaster can only be avoided if Ydt does not grow
at a positive exponential rate in the long run. Consequently, in this case, Propositions 2, 3
and 4 continue to apply.
2.4 Optimal environmental policy
We have so far studied the behavior of the laissez-faire equilibrium and discussed how envi-
ronmental disaster may be avoided. In this subsection, we characterize the optimal allocation
of resources in this economy and discuss how it can be decentralized by using pro￿t and in-
put taxes. The socially-planned (optimal) allocation will ￿correct￿for two externalities: (1)
the environmental externality exerted by dirty input producers, and (2) the knowledge exter-
nalities from R&D (the fact that in the laissez-faire equilibrium scientists do not internalize
the e⁄ects of their research on productivity in the future). In addition, the planner can and
will correct for the standard static monopoly distortion in the price of machines, encouraging
more intensive use of existing machines (see, for example, Acemoglu, 2009). Throughout this
section, we assume that the social planner (government) has access to lump-sum taxes and
transfers to complement the other policy instruments (and thus raise or redistribute revenues
as required).
2.4.1 The social planner￿ s problem
The social planner￿ s problem is one of choosing a dynamic path of ￿nal good production
Yt, consumption Ct, input productions Yjt, expected machines production xjit, labor share
allocation Ljt, scientists allocation sjt, environmental quality St; and quality of machines Ajit;
that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the representative consumer, (1), subject to (4),
(5), (7), (8), (9), (15), and
Ct = Yt ￿  
￿Z 1
0
xcitdi +
Z 1
0
xditdi
￿
: (23)
Let ￿t denote the Lagrange multiplier for (4), which is naturally also the shadow value of
one unit of ￿nal good production. The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to Yt imply that this
shadow value is also equal to the Lagrange multiplier for (23), so that it is also equal to the
shadow value of one unit of consumption. Then the ￿rst-order condition with respect to Ct
21yields
￿t =
1
(1 + ￿)
t
@u(Ct;St)
@C
; (24)
so that, again naturally, the shadow value of the ￿nal good is equal to the marginal utility of
consumption.
The ratio ￿jt=￿t can then be interpreted as the shadow price of input j at time t (relative
to the price of the ￿nal good). To emphasize this interpretation, we will denote this ratio by
pjt. We can now combine the ￿rst-order condition with respect to xji with (5) to obtain:26
Yjt =
￿
￿
 
pjt
￿ ￿
1￿￿
AjtLjt (25)
so that for given price, average technology and labor allocation, the production of each input
is scaled up by a factor ￿
￿
1￿￿ compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium (this results from the
more intensive use of machines in the socially-planned allocation).
Next, letting !t denote the Lagrange multiplier for the environmental equation (9), the
￿rst-order condition with respect to St gives
!t =
1
(1 + ￿)
t
@u(Ct;St)
@S
+ (1 + ￿)ISt<￿ S!t+1; (26)
where ISt<￿ S is equal to 1 if St < ￿ S and 0 otherwise. This implies that the price of one unit
of environmental quality at time t is equal to the marginal utility that it generates in this
period plus the price of (1 + ￿) units of environmental quality at time t + 1 (as one unit of
environmental quality at time t generates 1+￿ units at time t+1), so that the price of one unit
of environmental quality is equal to the marginal utility this unit generates in all subsequent
periods. In particular, this implies that if for all ￿ > T, S￿ = ￿ S, then !t = 0 for all t > T.
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to Yct and Ydt then give
Y
￿1
"
ct
￿
Y
"￿1
"
ct + Y
"￿1
"
dt
￿ 1
"￿1
= pct; (27)
Y
￿1
"
dt
￿
Y
"￿1
"
ct + Y
"￿1
"
dt
￿ 1
"￿1
￿
!t+1￿
￿t
= pdt:
These equations imply that compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium, the social planner intro-
duces a wedge of !t+1￿=￿t between the marginal product of the dirty input in the production
26This ￿rst-order condition with respect to xji yields
xjit =
￿
￿
 
pjt
￿ 1
1￿￿
AjitLjt =
￿
1
￿
pjt
￿ 1
1￿￿
AjitLjt;
which can be compared to the equilibrium inverse demand, (11), and highlights that existing machines will
be used more intensively in the socially-planned allocation. This is a natural consequence of the monopoly
distortions and can also be interpreted as the socially-planned allocation involving a subsidy of 1￿￿ in the use
of machines, so that their price should be identical to the marginal cost, i.e., (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) =￿ =   ￿ ￿
2.
22and its price. This wedge !t+1￿=￿t is equal to the environmental cost of an additional unit of
the dirty input (evaluated in terms of units of the ￿nal good at time t; recall that one unit of
dirty production at time t destroys ￿ units of environmental quality at time t + 1). Naturally,
this wedge is also equivalent to a tax of
￿t =
!t+1￿
￿tpdt
(28)
on the use of dirty input by the ￿nal good producer. This tax rate will be higher when the
shadow value of environmental quality is greater, when the marginal utility of consumption
today is lower, and when the price of dirty input is lower.27
Finally, the social planner must correct for the knowledge externality. Let ￿jt denote
the Lagrange multiplier for equation (15) for j = c;d. Naturally, this variable would then
correspond to the shadow value of average productivity in sector j at time t. The relevant
￿rst-order condition then gives:
￿jt = ￿t
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)p
1
1￿￿
jt Ljt +
￿
1 + ￿￿jsjt+1
￿
￿j;t+1: (29)
Intuitively, the shadow value of a unit increase in average productivity in sector j 2 fc;dg is
equal to its marginal contribution to time-t utility plus its shadow value at time t + 1 times
￿
1 + ￿￿jsjt+1
￿
(the number of units of productivity created out of it at time t + 1). This last
term captures the intertemporal knowledge externality.
At the optimum, scientists will be allocated towards the sector with the higher social gain
from innovation, as measured by ￿￿j￿jtAjt￿1. Using (29), we then have that the social planner
will allocate scientists to clean sector whenever the ratio
￿c (1 + ￿￿csct)
￿1 P
￿￿t
￿￿p
1
1￿￿
c￿ Lc￿Ac￿
￿d (1 + ￿￿dsdt)
￿1 P
￿￿t
￿￿p
1
1￿￿
d￿ Ld￿Ad￿
(30)
is greater than 1. This contrasts with the decentralized outcome where scientists are allocated
according to the private value of innovation, that is, according to the ratio
(￿tp
1
1￿￿
ct LctAct=￿tp
1
1￿￿
dt LdtAdt).28 As suggested by the discussion in the text, the optimal en-
27In Appendix D, we show that the tax rates is uniquely de￿ned by
￿
1￿"
t =
￿
!t+1￿
￿t
￿1￿"  
1 +
￿
A
1￿￿
dt
(1 + ￿t)A
1￿￿
ct
￿1￿"!
:
Using this expression, it is straightforward to establish that this optimal tax rate is increasing in Adt=Act, from
which the last result follows. This expression also shows the ￿rst two results more explicitly.
28The knowledge externality is extreme in our model because researchers (scientists) capture pro￿ts from
innovation for only one period. Nevertheless, a similar externality exists more generally in endogenous and
directed technical change models, where researchers do not fully capture the social value of innovation because
of both monopoly distortions and knowledge spillovers on future innovations (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002).
23vironmental policy can be implemented using a simple tax scheme, as stated in the next
proposition.
Proposition 7 The social planner can implement the social optimum through a tax on the use
of the dirty input, a tax/subsidy on the pro￿ts realized in the dirty sector and a subsidy for the
use of all machines (all proceeds from taxes/subsidies being redistributed/￿nanced lump-sum).
Proof. See Appendix D.
That we need both an input tax and a pro￿t tax to implement the social optimum (in addi-
tion to the subsidy to remove the monopoly distortions) is intuitive: the pro￿t tax deals with
future environmental externalities by directing innovation and therefore technical progress
towards the clean sector, whereas the input tax deals more directly with the current envi-
ronmental externality by reducing current production of the dirty input, which causes this
externality in the ￿rst place. By reducing production in the dirty sector, the input tax also
discourages innovation in that sector. However, using only the input tax to deal with both
current environmental externalities and future (knowledge-based) externalities would neces-
sitate a very high input tax, potentially distorting current production and reducing current
consumption excessively. An important implication of this result is therefore that, without
additional restrictions on policy, it would not be optimal to rely only on a carbon tax to deal
with global warming; one should also use additional instruments (pro￿t tax, R&D subsidies,
etc.) that direct innovation towards clean technologies, so that in the future production can
be increased using alternative technologies.
2.4.2 The structure of optimal environmental regulation
In subsection 2.3, we showed that a temporary pro￿t tax could prevent a disaster when the two
inputs are substitutes. Here we show that, when the two inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable
and the discount rate is su¢ ciently low, the optimal policy characterized in Proposition 7
also only involves temporary interventions (except for the standard subsidy that correct for
monopoly distortions).
More formally, recall that the optimal input tax schedule is given by ￿t = !t+1￿=￿tpdt;
where !t+1, the shadow value of one unit of environmental quality at time t + 1, is equal to
the discounted marginal utility of environmental quality as of period t + 1, that is:29
!t+1 =
1 X
v=t+1
(1 + ￿)
v￿(t+1) 1
(1 + ￿)
v
@u(Cv;Sv)
@S
ISt+1;:::;S￿<￿ S;
29We must have: lim
t!1
!t < 1; otherwise all !t would be in￿nite.
24where ISt+1;:::;S￿<￿ S takes value 1 if St+1;:::;S￿ < ￿ S and 0 otherwise. Thus, using (24), we get
￿t =
￿
pdt
1
1+￿
P1
v=t+1
￿
1+￿
1+￿
￿v￿(t+1)
ISt+1;:::;S￿<￿ S@u(Cv;Sv)=@S
@u(Ct;St)=@C
: (31)
This expression shows that once St reaches the upper bound ￿ S, then the optimal tax on
dirty input falls down to zero since @u
￿
Ct+1; ￿ S
￿
=@S = 0. This, in turn, has implications
on how the dynamics of the optimal tax schedule depend upon the degree of substitutability
between the clean and the dirty inputs.
Proposition 8 If " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿) and the discount rate ￿ is su¢ ciently small, the optimal
input tax, ￿t, and the optimal pro￿t tax, qt, are both temporary; in the long-run innovation
occurs only in the clean sector and the economy grows at a rate ￿￿c. If 1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿),
then in the long-run innovation still only occurs in the clean sector and the economy grows at
a rate ￿￿c, but the optimal input tax is permanent. Finally, if " < 1, then the optimal input
tax and the optimal pro￿t tax are permanent, and the long-run growth rate is zero.
Proof. See Appendix E.
To obtain an intuition for this proposition, ￿rst note that an optimal policy requires avoid-
ing a disaster, since a disaster leads to u(C;0) = ￿1. This in turn implies that the production
of dirty input must always remain below a ￿xed upper bound. This does not prevent positive
long-run growth in the substitutability case because ￿nal production can increasingly rely on
the clean input. An appropriately-chosen pro￿t tax then ensures that innovation occurs only
in the clean sector, and when Ac has su¢ ciently exceeded Ad, innovation in the clean sector
will have become su¢ ciently pro￿table that it will continue after the pro￿t tax is removed
(and hence there is no longer a need for the pro￿t tax). When the two inputs are strong sub-
stitutes (" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), production of dirty input decreases to 0 over time, and as a result,
the environmental stock St reaches ￿ S in ￿nite time due to positive regeneration. This in turn
ensures that the optimal input tax will reach zero in ￿nite time. Since dirty input production
converges to zero, the economy will generate a long-run growth rate equal to the growth rate
of Ac, namely ￿￿c.
In the complementarity case, the long-run growth rate of ￿nal output is the minimum of the
long-run growth rates of the two inputs, so it is not possible to achieve positive long-run growth
while avoiding a disaster. Nevertheless, avoiding an environmental disaster is still optimal, so
optimal environmental regulation will stop long-run growth.
2.4.3 A simple calibration exercise
Propositions 7 and 8 provided insights into the qualitative features of optimal environmental
policy. The next step is a careful quantitative analysis to investigate how the endogenous
25response of the direction of technical change a⁄ects the costs and bene￿ts of di⁄erent environ-
mental policies. While such a quantitative analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper,
we take a ￿rst step in this direction by presenting the results of a simple calibration exercise, in
particular focusing on the e⁄ects of di⁄erent discount rates and elasticities of substitution on
the timing of a switch (of R&D) to clean technology under optimal environmental regulation.
We use the same parameters as in Table 1, with ￿c = ￿d = 0:025; ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1=3,
and the values of Ac and Ad are computed exactly as described above, to match Yc and Yd
with nonfossil and fossil fuel consumptions in world energy supply and 2006. Estimating the
elasticity of substitution that would be appropriate for this exercise is beyond the scope of our
simple calibration exercise here. We simply note that since fossil and nonfossil fuels should
be close substitutes (once nonfossil fuels can be transported e¢ ciently), reasonable values of
" should be quite high. Here we start with a moderate baseline case of " = 3, which is the
elasticity between nonfossil and fossil fuel energy used in Van der Zwaan et al (2002), and then
also report results for " = 5 and higher values.
To relate the environmental quality variable S to the atmospheric concentration of carbon,
we used a widely-adopted approximation to the relationship between the increase in temper-
ature since preindustrial times (in degrees celsius), ￿, and the atmospheric concentration of
carbon dioxide (in ppm), CCO2:
￿ = 3log2 (CCO2=280):
This equation implies that a doubling of atmospheric concentration in CO2 (since pre-industrial
time, when the concentration was equal 280 ppm) leads to 3￿C increase in current temperature
(see, e.g., the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
We then express S as a decreasing function of ￿ and thus of CCO2, so that S = 0 corresponds
to a level of temperature change ￿ approximating ￿disaster temperature￿￿disaster (described
below). More speci￿cally, we set
S = 280 ￿ 2￿disaster=3 ￿ maxfCCO2;280g:
We relax the assumption that S0 = S and set the initial environmental quality S0 to correspond
to the current atmospheric concentration of 379 ppm (S, in turn, corresponds to CCO2 = 280
ppm, the pre-industrial value).
We then estimate parameter ￿ from the observed value of Yd and the annual emission of
CO2 (￿Yd in our model) in 2005 (7.5 GTC). Finally, we choose ￿ such that only half of the
amount of emitted carbon contributes to increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (the
rest being o⁄set by ￿environmental regeneration,￿see again the Fourth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). This implies a value of ￿ = 0:0009.
Nordhaus and much of the literature following his work assume that environmental quality
a⁄ects aggregate productivity. We ￿nd it more reasonable that high temperature levels and
26high concentrations of carbon dioxide a⁄ect utility as well as production and we formulated our
model under the assumption that environmental quality directly a⁄ects utility. Nevertheless,
to highlight the similarities and the di⁄erences between our model and existing quantitative
models with exogenous technology, we choose the parameters such that the welfare conse-
quences of changes in temperature (for the range of changes observed so far) are the same in
our model as in previous work. We parameterize the utility function as
u(Ct;St) =
(￿(St)Ct)
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
; (32)
with ￿ = 1:4, which is a CRRA function with a relative risk aversion parameter of 1.4, and
contains an additional term ￿(S) capturing the e⁄ects of environmental quality. We choose
this function as
￿(S) = ’(￿(S)) ￿
(￿disaster ￿ ￿(S))
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1
disaster (￿disaster ￿ ￿(S))
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
disaster
; (33)
for ￿(S) 2 [0;￿disaster], where ’ is strictly decreasing and concave function, with ’(0) = 1,
’(￿disaster) = 0, ’0 (0) = 0 and lim
￿!￿disaster
’0(￿) = ￿1, so that our assumptions on the
utility function, (2) and (3), are satis￿ed. In particular, (33) de￿nes a ￿ exible family of
continuous functions parameterized by ￿. As ￿ ! 1, this function converges to ’1(￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿=￿disaster)(1 ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿=￿disaster)) for all ￿ 2 [0;￿disaster) (from L￿Hopital￿ s rule)
and ’1(￿disaster) = 0, and as ￿ ! 1, it converges (pointwise) to the ￿step function￿’0(￿) = 1
for all ￿ 2 [0;￿disaster) and ’0(￿) = 0 for ￿ = ￿disaster. For our baseline calibration we
choose ￿disaster = 9:2￿C, which is twice the highest estimate of the temperature increase
that would eventually lead to the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet (the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). We then compute ￿ in order to
match our function ’ with the mapping between temperature and ￿nal output in Nordhaus￿
DICE 2007 model over the range of temperature increases up to 3.5￿C. This leads to a value of
￿ = 0:3933 in (33), and with this choice of ’ function, our model indeed generates e⁄ects that
are very close to those obtained in Nordhaus￿ s calibration exercises for increases in temperature
less than 3.5￿C. In our calibrations the temperature increases remain within this range of
values under the optimal environmental regulation, however, naturally the implications of
temperature increases outside this range in￿ uence the structure of optimal policy.30
The debate between Stern and Nordhaus highlighted that the discount rate plays an impor-
tant role in the implications of models with exogenous technology on optimal environmental
policy. We start with a moderate discount rate ￿ = 0:01 (per annum). Since ￿ = 1:4 in our
30Here, we note that in Nordhaus￿ s quantitative exercises, the damage from temperature increases beyond
3.5
￿C still remain modest. We do not ￿nd this feature, which is based on out-of-sample extrapolation, plausible,
and in our speci￿cation, where environmental quality directly a⁄ects utility, the cost of increases above 3.5
￿,
particularly those close to 9.2
￿, are substantial. It seems very plausible to us that increases in temperature close
to 9.2
￿C would have disastrous consequences for utility (as well as production).
27calibration, with a growth rate of 2.5% a year, this discount rate implies a long-run interest
rate of r = ￿ + ￿g = 0:01 + 1:4 ￿ 0:025 = 4:5%.
Figure 1: Results from baseline calibration with ￿ = 0:01 under the optimal environmental
regulation. The ￿gure shows the evolution of clean and dirty technologies (Ac and Ad) and
aggregate consumption (C) in panel A, of the temperature increase (￿) in panel B, the optimal
input tax (￿) in panel C, and the optimal pro￿t tax (q) in panel D.
Figure 1A shows the form of optimal policy under these parameter choices. It shows that
optimal environmental policy induces an immediate (and permanent) switch of all R&D to
clean technologies. Consequently, when this optimal environmental policy is implemented,
Ad remains constant and Ac grows steadily over time. Final good consumption also grows
steadily. It is important to note that while all R&D switches to clean technologies, the relative
(and absolute) production of dirty inputs does not immediately decline. In particular, in this
case it takes over 70 years for 90% of all energy consumption to be met from clean (nonfossil)
sources. As a consequence, and perhaps more importantly, temperature increases do not cease
immediately. Figure 1B show that under this optimal pro￿le, temperature increases a further
2.8￿C in 85 years, and then decreases slowly thereafter. Figure 1C shows that the optimal
input tax schedule increases very slowly at the beginning until it reaches approximately 5.2%
28in 85 years; thereafter, it decreases (beyond the horizon covered in the ￿gure, it reaches 0
when the increase in temperature has returned back to 0). Finally, Figure 1D shows that the
optimal pro￿t tax decreases rapidly and reaches zero after 26 years; thereafter, equilibrium
R&D is directed to clean technologies without further intervention.
An interesting implication of the simple calibration exercise is that the main quantitative
conclusions of this model of directed technical change are broadly similar for a range of discount
factors the previous literature considered (and found to matter considerably for the policy
recommendations with exogenous technology). To illustrate this, we show the results of two
alternative calibrations with discount rates of ￿ = 0:001 (similar to that used in the the Stern
report) and ￿ = 0:015 (similar to that assumed by Nordhaus in the DICE model). Figures 2 and
3 show that the broad qualitative features of optimal policy are across these di⁄erent values of
the discount rate; most notably, in each case, optimal policy involves all R&D resources being
immediately devoted to clean technologies (and essentially all production eventually using clean
technologies). The results for this range of discount rates are similar when we consider perhaps
more realistic and higher elasticities, for example, " = 5.
Figure 2: Results from a calibration with ￿ = 0:001 under the optimal environmental regula-
tion.
29Figure 3: Results from a calibration with ￿ = 0:015.
Panels A in both Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that under the optimal environmental reg-
ulation, R&D again switches to clean technologies immediately. The discount rate naturally
a⁄ects the level of the input tax; it is lower when ￿ is higher, since in this case the planner does
not wish to sacri￿ce as much current growth to increase the quality of the environment (see
panels C in Figures 2 and Figure 3). As a consequence, temperature increases slightly more
when ￿ = 0:015 than when ￿ = 0:001 (panels B in Figures 2 and Figure 3). Nevertheless, the
most notable feature here is the similarity between the qualitative and quantitative features of
optimal policy across these di⁄erent discount rates.
Naturally, as the discount rate is raised further, the switch to clean technologies may occur
more slowly over time. For example, when ￿ = 0:02 and " = 3, the switch of R&D to clean
technologies occurs progressively between periods 44 and 53; as a consequence there is more
dirty input produced early on. This is partly counteracted by a higher input tax during the
intervening period (reaching more than 45%). Notably, however, even when ￿ = 0:02, the
switch to R&D directed towards clean technologies occurs immediately for slightly higher but
still reasonable values of ", for example for " ￿ 5.
302.4.4 Comparison to undirected technical change
We now illustrate how directed technical change a⁄ects the optimal policy and the costs of
delay in environmental intervention. For comparison, as in subsection 2.3, consider a world
without directed technical change, that is, a world where technical change does not respond to
economic incentives. Instead, a ￿xed fraction sc = ￿c=(￿c + ￿d) of scientists is always allocated
to innovation in clean sector￿ s machines. Then both clean and dirty technologies will always
grow at rate ￿e ￿. Consequently, in the absence of an input tax, dirty input production will
grow over time and lead the economy to a disaster. Thus, as in subsection 2.3, the only way to
avoid an environmental disaster is by imposing a permanent tax on the use of the dirty input
(a carbon tax). Moreover, because the dirty technology is improving over time, this input tax
needs to increase over time. Also note that without directed technical change, the growth rate
of the economy will be bounded above by ￿e ￿ in the substitutability case, or equal to 0 in the
complementarity case. This establishes (proof in the text):
Proposition 9 With undirected technical change, when " > 1, optimal environmental regula-
tion involves a growth rate always less than ￿e ￿. When " < 1, optimal environmental regulation
involves no growth in the long run. In both cases, the optimal input tax is permanent and
increasing over time.
This proposition therefore further clari￿es how directed technical change acts as a force
favoring a strong policy intervention in the short run in order to prompt a switch towards
innovation directed at clean technologies. This is because the sooner the economy can transition
to clean technologies, the more limited is the ￿transition cost￿ . Equally important is that
when technical change is directed, the optimal policy can keep Ad constant while Ac grows,
so the optimal input tax will be decreasing over time. In contrast, with undirected technical
change, Ad will keep increasing over time, and therefore the tax must also increase steadily.
This proposition therefore shows that the ability of researchers to direct their innovations
signi￿cantly increases the importance of timely policy intervention and that this conclusion
contrasts with those that follow from models with exogenous technology (where the general
consensus is that interventions should be gradual and the cost of delay is typically ignored or
viewed as second-order).
To further illustrate the implications of directed technical change on the structure of optimal
environmental regulation (and the resulting allocations), we now report the results of another
calibration exercise, with the only di⁄erence from the benchmark being that a constant fraction
￿c=(￿c + ￿d) of scientists is now allocated to the clean sector regardless of policy (which is an
implication of undirected technical change). The results are reported in Figure 4, which, most
notably, shows that in contrast to the economy with directed technical change (Figures 1, 2
and 3 above), here the average productivity of clean technologies, Ac, never catches up with
31the average productivity of dirty inputs, Ad. As a consequence, the level of production of dirty
inputs remains high and the temperature increases to levels very close to those that would
create an environmental disaster. Finally, because research cannot be redirected towards clean
technologies, optimal policy relies on the input tax to reduce environmental degradation; as a
result, the optimal input tax increases over time and becomes much higher than in the case
with directed technical change (Figure 1).
Figure 4: Results for the model with undirected technical change for benchmark parameter
values.
Table 1 in subsection 2.3 quanti￿ed the costs of delay in terms of the number of additional
periods of slow growth that this delay would induce. We can now compute the welfare costs of
delaying implementation of the optimal policy. For this purpose, we repeated the same simu-
lation as above, except that the pro￿t and input taxes are assumed to be equal to zero during
the ￿rst 20 periods (so that the simulations show ￿optimal policies￿after 20 periods delay).31
31In order to make the comparison more meaningful, we maintain the optimal subsidy on machines, which
corrects for the standard monopoly distortions, during the ￿rst 20 periods as well.
32The results are shown in Figure 5. Figure 5A indicates that Ad increases only during the ￿rst
twenty periods (before the optimal policy is implemented); thereafter Ac increases when all
R&D is optimally directed to the clean sector. Consumption growth is signi￿cantly reduced
following the introduction of environmental regulation, and is signi￿cantly lower because of
the delay in intervention. Figure 5B shows that the temperature increases rapidly and reaches
a much higher level than the case without delay. Figure 5C shows that delayed intervention
also makes the optimal input tax much higher than otherwise, while Figure 5D shows that it
further necessitates a longer duration for the pro￿t tax (because during the period of delay,
the gap between clean and dirty technologies increases).
Figure 5: Consequences of delayed intervention (benchmark parameter values).
Table 2 shows the welfare costs of delay in terms of its consumption equivalent, that is,
by how much consumption without delay should be reduced per period to give exactly the
same level of welfare as the policy that involves delayed intervention (we assume that when
intervention starts, it takes the form of optimal environmental regulation as characterized
earlier in this subsection). Di⁄erent numbers in the table correspond to percentage reductions
in consumption for di⁄erent values of the substitutability parameter " (changing accordingly the
initial value Act￿1 and Adt￿1) and for di⁄erent numbers of periods of delay. The table clearly
33shows that delay costs are substantial, and increase considerably with the duration of the delay
and the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs.32 Interestingly, we also ￿nd that
the welfare costs of delay are largely due to the slow growth that delayed intervention induces
(as characterized this subsection 2.3) rather than the further degradation of the environment.
This again highlights the importance of directed technical change for the results reported here.
Table 2: Welfare costs of delayed intervention in function of the elasticity of
substitution
(Percentage reductions in consumption relative to immediate intervention)
delayn" 2 3 5 10
5 1.6 3.0 5.1 7.4
10 2.5 5.3 8.9 12.8
20 4.1 8.5 14.1 19.9
30 5.4 10.7 17.4 24.1
In Table 3 we repeat the same exercise keeping the elasticity of substitution at " = 5, but
varying the discount rate ￿. The cost of delay is substantial even for relatively high discount
rates, and naturally, it increases signi￿cantly as the discount rate decreases. Note also that
the variations in the delay cost are as large as, or greater than, the magnitudes in Table 2;
this suggests that the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty input is as important
as the discount rate when assessing the costs of delaying intervention.
Table 3: Welfare costs of delayed intervention in function of the discount rate
(Percentage reductions in consumption relative to immediate intervention)
delayn￿ 0.001 0.01 0.015
5 5.4 3.0 1.9
10 10.0 5.3 3.1
20 17.6 8.5 4.5
30 23.7 10.7 4.6
Finally, we brie￿ y discuss the welfare costs of relying solely on the input (carbon) tax
instead of combining it with the pro￿t tax (which is the pattern of optimal environmental
policy in Proposition 8). Table 4 shows that the welfare loss from relying only on the input
tax, which in turn leads to excessive reductions in production, is nonnegligible, though small
relative to the costs reported in Tables 2 and 3. Interestingly, the welfare loss is higher the
32When the two inputs are close substitutes, further advances in dirty technologies that occur before the
optimal policy is enacted turn out to not contribute much to aggregate ouput once clean technologies have
become su¢ ciently more advanced than dirty technologies.
34smaller the elasticity of substitution, ", because when the elasticity is higher a relatively small
input tax is su¢ cient to redirect R&D to clean technologies.
Table 4: Welfare costs of relying only on the input tax
(Percentage reductions in consumption relative to optimal policy)
" 2 3 5 10
cost 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1
3 Directed technical change with exhaustible resources
Polluting activities often make use of exhaustible resources such as oil or coal. In this section
we analyze a variant of our basic model where dirty input production uses an exhaustible
resource. Exhaustibility of polluting resources may help prevent an environmental disaster
because it increases the cost of using the dirty input even without policy intervention. In
particular, we will show that the presence of an exhaustible resource can prevent a disaster in
the laissez-faire equilibrium when the two inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable. However, when
the two inputs are complementary, the resource constraint tilts innovation towards the dirty
technology, but also prevents long-run sustainable growth.
More formally, we amend our basic model by assuming that the dirty input is now produced
according to the technology:
Ydt = R
￿2
t L1￿￿
dt
Z 1
0
A
1￿￿1
dit x
￿1
ditdi; (34)
where Rt is the ￿ ow consumption of the exhaustible resource at time t, and ￿1 + ￿2 = ￿ (so
the labor share in the production of intermediary input remains 1 ￿ ￿). The basic model is
then simply a subcase of this extended model with ￿2 = 0. We assume that the exhaustible
resource can be directly extracted at a cost c(Qt) in term of units of ￿nal good, where Qt
denotes the resource stock at date t, and c is a decreasing function of Q. This speci￿cation
makes the exhaustible resource also subject to the ￿tragedy of the commons￿ : the price of
the exhaustible resource does not re￿ ect its scarcity value. This assumption is adopted to
simplify the exposition. When we characterize optimal environmental regulation below, this
scarcity value will feature in the social planner￿ s optimization problem. Given the amount of
extraction, the evolution of the exhaustible resource is given by the di⁄erence equation:
Qt+1 = Qt ￿ Rt (35)
In the ￿rst subsection we analyze the laissez-faire equilibrium of this augmented model,
and in the second subsection we derive the socially optimal environmental regulation.
353.1 The laissez-faire equilibrium
The structure of equilibrium remains mostly unchanged, particularly the equilibrium demands
for the two types of inputs, and the production of clean inputs. The equilibrium demands for
machines used in the dirty sector become:
xdit =
 
(￿1)
2 pdtR
￿2
t Ldt
1￿￿
 
! 1
1￿￿1
Adit:
Pro￿ts of monopolists and expected pro￿ts from research in the dirty sector are also modi￿ed
accordingly.
The relative pro￿t abilities of innovation in the clean or in the dirty sector re￿ ect the same
three e⁄ects as before: the direct productivity e⁄ect, the price e⁄ect and the market size e⁄ect
identi￿ed above. The only change relative to the baseline model is that the resource stock now
a⁄ects the magnitude of the price and market size e⁄ects. In particular, as the resource stock
declines, the e⁄ective productivity of the dirty input also declines and its price increases. We
show in Appendix F that the price ratio of dirty to clean input is now given by:
pct
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and the relative employment in the two sectors becomes
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(where ’1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ")) so that the share of labor allocated to the dirty sector decreases
with the extraction cost only when the two inputs are substitutes. Using these expressions, we
obtain the ratio of expected pro￿ts from research in the two sectors, which will determine the
direction of equilibrium research, as (see Appendix F):
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The main di⁄erence from the pro￿t ratio in the baseline model is the term c(Qt)￿2("￿1)
in the right hand side of (38). This new term, together with the assumption that c(Qt) is
decreasing in Qt; implies the following proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 10 As the resource stock gets depleted over time, innovation incentives in the
clean sector increase when two inputs are substitute (" > 1) but decrease when the two inputs
are complements (" < 1).
36Intuitively, resource depletion increases the relative price of the dirty input, and thus re-
duces the market for the dirty input. In the substitutability case this encourages innovation in
the clean sector. In fact, in the laissez-faire equilibrium, innovation will ultimately occur in the
clean sector only (either because the extraction cost increases su¢ ciently rapidly, inducing all
innovation to be directed at clean machines, or because the resource stock gets fully depleted
in ￿nite time). In this case, the dirty input is not essential to ￿nal production and therefore,
provided that initial environmental quality is su¢ ciently high, an environmental disaster can
be avoided while the economy achieves positive long-run growth at the rate ￿￿c. In contrast,
in the complementarity case the increase in the relative price of the dirty input encourages
innovation in the dirty sector. In addition, in this case the dirty input remains essential for
￿nal production. Thus positive growth requires an ever increasing rate of extraction, which
in turn leads to the exhaustion of the natural resource in ￿nite time. This in turn prevents
positive long-run growth. This discussion therefore establishes (proof in the text):
Proposition 11 1. When the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1), innovation in the long-
run will be directed towards the clean sector only and the economy will grow at a rate
￿￿c. Provided that ￿ S is su¢ ciently high, an environmental disaster is avoided under
laissez-faire.
2. When the two inputs are complements (" < 1), economic growth is not sustainable in the
long-run.
Proof. See Appendix G.
The most important result in this proposition is that when an exhaustible resource is
necessary for production of the dirty input, the market generates incentives for research to be
directed towards the clean sector, and these market-generated incentives may be su¢ cient for
the prevention of environmental disaster. This contrasts with the result that an environmental
disaster was unavoidable under laissez-faire without the exhaustible resource. Therefore, to the
extent that increasing price of oil and oil extraction will create a natural move away from dirty
inputs (and other activities creating environmental degradation), the implications of growth
are not as damaging to the environment as our baseline model suggests. Nevertheless, because
of the environmental and the knowledge externalities, even though an environmental disaster
can be averted, the equilibrium is still Pareto suboptimal (even if it avoids an environmental
disaster) and the next subsection discusses the structure of optimal environmental regulation
with an exhaustible resource.
3.2 Optimal environmental regulation with exhaustible resources
We now brie￿ y discuss the structure of optimal policy with exhaustible resource. The social
planner again maximizes (1), now subject to subject to the constraints: (4), (7), (8), (9), (15),
37(34) (which replaces (5)), the resource constraint Qt ￿ 0,
Ct = Yt ￿   (Xct + Xdt) ￿ c(Qt)Rt; (39)
and the law of motion of the resource stock given by (35):
As in subsection 2.4, the social planner will correct for the monopoly distortion by subsi-
dizing the use of machines and will again introduce a wedge between the shadow price of the
dirty input and its marginal product in the production of the ￿nal good, equivalent to a tax
￿t = !t+1￿=￿tpdt on dirty input production. In addition, as noted above, we have assumed
that the private cost of extraction as given by c(Q) and does not incorporate the scarcity value
of the exhaustible resource. The social planner will naturally recognize this scarcity value and
will use a ￿resource tax￿to create a wedge between the cost of extraction and the social value
of the exhaustible resource.
We denote the Lagrange multiplier for the equation (35) by mt. Then, the ￿rst-order
condition with respect to Rt implies:
￿2pdtR￿2￿1L1￿￿
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di di =
mt
￿t
+ c(Q);
where recall that pjt = ￿jt=￿t. Here, the wedge mt=￿t is the value, in time t units of ￿nal
good, of one unit of resource at time t.
The shadow value of one unit of natural resource at time t is then determined by the
￿rst-order condition with respect to Qt, which is
mt = mt￿1 + ￿tc0 (Qt)Rt
and thus implies
mt = m1 +
1 X
v=t+1
￿v
￿
￿c0 (Qv)
￿
Rv:
(where m1 is the limit of mt when t ! 1).
Thus achieving the social optimum requires a resource tax equal to
￿t =
mt
￿tc(Qt)
=
m1 ￿
1 P
v=t+1
1
(1+￿)v￿tc0 (Qv)Rv@u(Cv;Sv)=@C
c(Qt)@u(Ct;St)=@C
: (40)
In particular, the optimal resource tax is always positive. This establishes:
Proposition 12 The social planner can implement the social optimum through a tax on the
use of the dirty input, a tax on pro￿ts in the dirty sector, a subsidy on the use of all machines
and a resource tax (all proceeds from taxes/subsidies being redistributed/￿nanced lump-sum).
The resource tax must be maintained forever.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 7 and is omitted to save space.
384 Global environmental externalities and policy coordination
We now study a two-country extension of the baseline model in order to investigate the implica-
tions of environmental and knowledge externalities on the need for global policy coordination.
We ask whether environmental regulation in one set of countries (the more advanced North)
can be su¢ cient to avoid environmental disasters and how this conclusion is a⁄ected by the
presence or absence of international trade.
The world economy consists of two ￿countries,￿North and South, and we index all variables
(except the quality of the environment, which is common to all countries) with a superscript
k 2 fN;Sg. We think of the North as the technological leader and of the South as representing
countries behind the world technology frontier (that are less productive and less prosperous).
The environmental quality S enters the utility of households in both countries in the same
way as in (1). Most importantly, environmental externalities are global, thus the law of motion
of the quality of the environment is a function of the total dirty input production in the two
countries. In particular, equation (9) is now replaced with
St+1 = maxf0;min
￿
￿￿
￿
Y N
dt + Y S
dt
￿
+ (1 + ￿)St; ￿ S
￿
g: (41)
The North is identical to the economy described in the baseline model of Section 2. To
simplify the discussion, we assume that the South has exactly the same production structure
(the same technology for ￿nal production, (4), the same technology for the production of dirty
and clean inputs, (5), and the same marginal cost of producing machines,   ￿ ￿2 units of
the ￿nal good), and also has s = 1 scientists, but Southern scientists work only on imitating
already developed technologies in the North. This assumption captures the intuitive notion
that the South is technologically less advanced and adopts the innovations developed in the
North (perhaps with some delay).33
Southern scientists direct their (imitation) research towards dirty or clean machines in the
same way that Northern scientists did. In particular, once they choose a particular sector, as
with the Northern scientists, they are randomly allocated to a single machine in the sector of
their choice, and in sector j 2 fc;dg they have a probability ￿j 2 (0;1) of successfully imitating
this machine (again without congestion, so there is at most one scientist per machine). If they
are successful, they will have imitated the frontier machine in the North, thus for machine i in
sector j 2 fc;dg, they will have access to the machine of quality AN
jit. Moreover, they will be
given a one period monopoly rights over this successfully imitated machine (for use in the South
only). For a machine type for which there has not been as successful innovation, monopoly
rights are allocated to a Southern entrepreneur drawn at random, and this entrepreneur will
33Naturally, we could allow scientists in the South to also choose whether to work towards original innovations
or to imitate Northern technologies. We do not introduce this choice to simplify the exposition and focus on
the e⁄ects of Northern technological advances on technology adoption decisions in the South, which is a crucial
global interaction that has not been highlighted by previous analyses.
39use the technology from the previous period AS
jit￿1. Therefore, the structure of technological
advances in the South is very similar to that in the North, with the only di⁄erence being that
￿success￿brings a machine of quality equal to the frontier quality in the North rather than an
incremental improvement over the current machine quality in the South.
Given these assumptions, when sS
jt scientists in the South undertake research in sector
j 2 fc;dg at time t, the law of motion of average technology of sector j 2 fc;dg in the South
evolves according to:
AS
jt = ￿jsS
jtAN
jt +
￿
1 ￿ ￿jsS
jt
￿
AS
jt￿1: (42)
This equation, together with the law of motion of productivity in the North, (15), gives the
evolution of productivity levels in the two sectors in the North and the South.
In the remainder of this section, we ￿rst investigate this global economy without trade in
inputs, and then turn to the implications of international trade for the environment and the
need for global policy coordination.
4.1 Preventing environmental disaster without global policy coordination
Suppose to start with that the North follows an environmental policy (sequences of taxes)
denoted by
￿
￿N
t ;qN
t
￿
, where ￿N
t is input tax at time t and qN
t is the pro￿t tax on dirty
innovation (both of those applied only in the North). There is no global policy coordination,
so that these policies do not apply to producers in the South. Instead, to capture the relevant
situation in which environmental regulations are more lax in developing countries, we assume
that the Southern ￿rms operate under laissez-faire.
Since in the South all machines are also supplied by monopolists, the static equilibrium
in both the South and the North, given technology levels, is the same as that given by our
analysis in subsection 2.2. In addition, as with the researchers in the North, the decision of
Southern scientists to direct their (imitation) activity towards dirty or clean inputs will be
determined by the relative pro￿tability of having access to monopoly rights (for one period) in
the two sectors. The expected pro￿ts from these monopoly rights in the South are denoted by
￿S
jt for sector j 2 fc;dg at time t and are given by an equation very similar to (16), adapted
only to the di⁄erent innovation possibilities frontier facing Southern scientists:
￿S
jt = ￿j (1 ￿ ￿)￿(pS
jt)
1
1￿￿LS
jtAN
jt:
The crucial di⁄erence here from (16) is that successful imitation will lead to the imitation
of the currently available technology in the North, which explains the term AN
jt at the end.
Consequently, the pro￿tability of imitating clean relative to dirty technologies in the South is
determined by the ratio
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: (43)
40If this ratio is greater than 1, then imitation will be directed to the clean sector only; and if
it is smaller than one, imitation will be directed towards the dirty sector only (￿nally, if it is
equal to 1 imitation can occur in both sectors simultaneously).34
Equation (43) shows that the relative pro￿tability of imitation of di⁄erent types of machines
is shaped by the same market size and price e⁄ects that determined innovation in the North.
However, there is also a di⁄erent type of knowledge externality, re￿ ected by the term (AN
ct=AN
dt)
on the right hand side of (43), now resulting from the innovation decisions in the North.
Intuitively, pro￿ts from imitation are proportional to the target productivity level, which here
is the technology in the North, and thus, this knowledge externality favors imitation in the
sector that is relatively more advanced in the North. In particular if the quality of clean
machines becomes much higher than the quality of dirty machines in the North, this will create
an incentive for the South to imitate in the clean sector. This last observation is important
for understanding why, under certain circumstances, environmental disaster can be avoided
without global policy coordination.
More speci￿cally, a key implication of (43) is that if " > 1 and the North devotes all its
research e⁄ort to innovation on clean machines, ￿rms in the South will also eventually switch
to clean imitation activities, and AS
ct will grow in the long-run as the same rate as AN
ct , namely
at rate ￿￿c.35 Now, suppose that indeed the North undertakes an environmental policy that
redirects all innovation towards the clean sector, but there is no global policy coordination, so
that the South remains under laissez-faire. To analyze the conditions under which a disaster
can be avoided, we can look at the long-run growth rate of dirty input production in the South.
The equilibrium production of dirty inputs in the South, given average productivity levels that
￿rms have access to, will be given by the equivalent of (21) from our analysis in subsection 2.3,
and thus:
Y S
dt =
￿
AS
ct
￿’+￿ AS
dt
￿￿
AS
ct
￿’ +
￿
AS
dt
￿’￿ ￿+’
’
: (44)
This expression highlights that in the long run, output of the dirty input in the South will
be approximately equal to Y S
dt ￿
￿
AS
ct=AS
dt
￿’+￿, which decreases if ’ + ￿ < 0 (that is if
34It may also be useful to write this expression in terms in term of time-t ￿ 1 productivity levels, which is
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35Too see this, note that: (i) A
S
ct cannot grow faster than A
N
ct since the South cannot do better than imitating
the North; (ii) in the long run, A
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it grew more slowly; then (43), together with the fact that A
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dt and therefore A
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innovates in the clean sector only, would imply that ￿
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dt goes to in￿nity as t ! 1; but then imitation in
the South would end up occurring in the clean sector only in ￿nite time; this in turn implies that A
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must grow at the same rate in the long-run, yielding a contradiction; (iii) the fact that A
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the same rate in the long-run in turn implies that ￿
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dt must exceed 1, and consequently, in ￿nite time all
imitation in the South will switch to the clean sector.
41" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), and otherwise grows at rate (1 + ￿￿c)
’+￿ ￿ 1.
Given this observation, the main insights here parallel those in subsection 2.3. In particu-
lar, as in subsection 2.3, when " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿), the global production of dirty input will grow to
in￿nity (since production over the dirty input in the South grows steadily over time). Conse-
quently, an environmental disaster is unavoidable. In contrast, when " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), i.e., when
the two inputs are strong substitutes, environmental disaster can be avoided if ￿ S is su¢ ciently
large. As all innovation in the North is directed to clean inputs, in this case, the production of
dirty inputs in the North stops growing. The analysis in this subsection shows that Southern
scientists will ultimately imitate clean technologies in the North. Moreover, equation (44) then
implies that the production of dirty inputs in the South will also stop growing. Thus with a
su¢ ciently high level of initial environmental quality, a global environmental disaster can be
prevented even without global policy coordination. The role of directed technical change in
this result is clear, since it is directed technical change that allows the North to redirect inno-
vation towards clean technologies, and it is also the ability of Southern scientists to redirect
their imitation activity towards clean technologies that enables Southern ￿rms to switch to
clean frontier technologies once these have become su¢ ciently advanced.
We summarize this result in the next proposition (proof omitted):
Proposition 13 In the two-country case when " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), a policy
￿
￿N
t ;qN
t
￿
in the North
that would direct innovation towards clean technologies only, is su¢ cient to avoid a disaster
without taxation in the South provided that S is su¢ ciently high. If 1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿) such a
policy cannot prevent a disaster.
Proposition 13 shows that a global environmental disaster can be avoided using simple
policies (without global policy coordination). Clearly, optimal environmental regulation will
be more complex in this case and will involve global policy coordination. For completeness, we
characterize the structure of optimal environmental regulation in Appendix I (from the point
of view of a global social planner interested in maximizing the sum of the utilities of households
in both countries given by (1)). The following proposition summarizes the main results:
Proposition 14 The global social optimum can be implemented through a combination of prof-
its and input taxes both in the North and in the South, and a subsidy to machine consumers
(against the standard monopoly distortion). If " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), all optimal environmental regu-
lation (taxes) are temporary.
4.2 International trade and pollution havens
The argument that knowledge spillovers should induce the South to follow the North in its
switch to clean technologies may be counteracted by international trade, creating a greater
need for global policy coordination in environmental policies. In particular, free international
42trade between the North and the South, combined with environmental regulation in the North,
creates a comparative advantage in dirty input production in the South. Loosely speaking, in
this case, the South may become a ￿pollution haven￿ . This in turn may make an environmental
disaster more likely.
To investigate these issues, we now allow international trade in inputs between the North
and the South. Our model will behave as a Ricardian model within each period, with the
productivity of a sector in each country depending on technology and policies. We focus
on the case where " > 1. As in subsection 4.1, we assume (i) that the North follows an
environmental policy
￿
￿N
t ;qN
t
￿
where ￿N
t is a tax on the production of the dirty input in the
North, and qN
t is a tax on pro￿ts in the dirty sector in the North, such that the government in
the North redirects innovation towards the clean technology only; (ii) that the South remains
under pure laissez-faire. But now there is free trade in inputs.
Similarly to (18) in the one country case, equilibrium input production levels are given by:
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where j 2 fc;dg;k 2 fN;Sg; and pk
j is the pre-tax price of input j in country k:
The ratio of marginal products of labor in sectors c and d in country k is then equal to.
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Whichever country has a higher ratio in (46) will have a comparative advantage in the clean
sector; the other country will have a comparative advantage in the dirty sector.
Next note that free trade also implies that the post-tax price for each input (j = c;d) must
be equalized in the North and the South, so that:
pN
ct = pS
ct and (1 + ￿N
t )pN
dt = pS
dt: (47)
Thus the South will have a comparative advantage in producing the dirty input at time t if
￿
1 + ￿N
t
￿ 1
1￿￿ AN
ct
AN
dt
>
AS
ct
AS
dt
: (48)
This expression implies that both a higher input tax rate ￿N
t in the North and a higher
relative quality of clean machines in the North reinforce the South￿ s comparative advantage in
dirty input production. This is the ￿pollution haven hypothesis￿in a world with endogenous
technology. In this case, there is a possibility that environmental policy in the North may
induce dirty activities to move to the South, which will then export part of its dirty input
production back to the North. If innovation and imitation decisions also reinforce this pattern,
this type of international trade may increase the likelihood of an environmental disaster.
43To illustrate the main ideas, let us ￿rst focus on the case in which both countries fully spe-
cialize, that is, the North only produces clean inputs and the South only produces dirty inputs
(the more general case is studied in Appendix H, which also provides a su¢ cient condition for
complete specialization to occur in equilibrium). Under complete specialization, equilibrium
input production levels in the South and the North are given by:
Y S
d =
￿
pS
d
￿ ￿
1￿￿ AS
dLS, Y N
d = 0, Y N
c = (pc)
￿
1￿￿ AN
c LN and Y S
c = 0: (49)
Therefore, without any environmental regulation in the South and with complete specialization,
Southern scientists will target machines in the dirty sector. Then whether the global economy
can avoid the disaster will depend on the rate of growth of the production of dirty inputs in
the South. Recall that AN
c grows in the long-run at rate ￿￿c, while AN
d is constant. Since the
South imitates the North, this implies that AS
d will also be constant. Using these observations,
we show in Appendix H that in the long-run:
Y S
d ’
￿
￿2
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿
AN
c LN￿ ￿
"(1￿￿)+￿ ￿
AS
dLS￿ "(1￿￿)
"(1￿￿)+￿ ;
which increases at a rate (1 + ￿￿c)
￿
"(1￿￿)+￿ ￿ 1 > 0, implying that an environmental disaster
cannot be avoided without global policy coordination. This argument then suggests that an
environmental disaster is more likely to occur under free trade than under no-trade (without
global policy coordination or environmental regulations in the South). The intuition for this
result is essentially given by the ￿pollution haven￿hypothesis: the production of dirty inputs
migrates to the South and does not decline despite environmental regulations and innovation
in clean technologies in the North. Nevertheless, this result only holds in this sharp form when
there is complete specialization. The next proposition shows that, under certain conditions,
there exists a complete specialization equilibrium (though this is not the unique equilibrium).
We then discuss how ￿pollution haven￿ -type ideas apply more generally in Proposition 16.
Proposition 15 Consider the two-country case with free trade in inputs (j = c;d). When
the two inputs are strong substitutes (" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)) and AS
c0 is su¢ ciently small, there exists
an equilibrium in which any environmental policy
￿
￿N
t ;qN
t
￿
in the North redirecting technical
change to the clean sector is insu¢ cient to avoid an environmental disaster under free trade
(though it would have avoided a disaster under autarky).
Proof. See Appendix H.
Proposition 15 shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the South will completely
specialize in dirty inputs and in this equilibrium, environmental regulation in the North is not
su¢ cient to prevent an environmental disaster. However, the analysis in Appendix H shows
that for the same parameter values, there may also exist another equilibrium in which Southern
44scientists coordinate and switch to clean technologies. We next present a complementary result
showing that under free trade there is higher production of dirty input in the South even if
Southern scientists could fully coordinate to make the switch to clean technologies whenever
it is jointly bene￿cial for them. This result therefore illustrates another, perhaps more robust,
facet of the ￿pollution haven￿hypothesis.
Before stating this result, we brie￿ y provide the general intuition. For given technologies,
trade opening always induces an increase in the production of the dirty input in the South.
The countervailing e⁄ect is that it also reduces the production of dirty input in the North (both
relative to autarky). Let us focus on the case where the two inputs are highly substitutable,
in particular, " > (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) (which implies " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)). In this case, the global
production of the dirty input increases under the following scenarios (at time t): (i) if there
is complete specialization in the South and the production of dirty input in the North under
autarky was already low to start with;36 or (ii) if there is incomplete specialization in the South,
but the South has a ￿technological￿comparative advantage in the production of the dirty input,
that is, if
￿
AN
ct=AN
dt
￿
>
￿
AS
ct=AS
dt
￿
. If so, then trade opening increases the global production of
the dirty input. Whether either of these scenarios apply depends on how technologies in the
South will evolve under free trade. Here, we can also show that trade liberalization induces
increased imitation in the dirty sector in the South because of the market size e⁄ect (the market
size for dirty inputs in the South has increased due to trade opening).37 Consequently, in this
case, trade opening will necessarily increase the global production of the dirty input both
upon impact and subsequently, and thus, it will create greater environmental degradation.
Moreover, this conclusion now holds when scientists in the South can coordinate to switch
to clean technologies whenever doing so is an equilibrium. This result is stated in the next
proposition, which imposes su¢ cient conditions for both the impact and the subsequent e⁄ects
to work in the same direction (and increase the global production of the dirty input).
Proposition 16 Suppose that (a) the two inputs are highly substitutable (" > (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿));
(b) the amount of dirty input produced in the North under autarky is su¢ ciently low; (c)
the South has an initial technological comparative advantage in dirty inputs, i.e., AN
c0=AN
d0 >
(1 + ￿￿c=￿c)=(1 + ￿￿c) > AS
c0=AS
d0; and (d) whenever there are multiple equilibria with imita-
tion of both clean and dirty technologies, scientists in the South coordinate on imitating clean
technologies. Then the level of production of dirty inputs under free trade is always greater
than under autarky, and for su¢ ciently high levels of initial environmental quality, there exist
policies
￿
￿N
t ;qN
t
￿
that direct innovation towards clean technologies in the North can avoid an
36This would be the case, for example, if the clean technology in the North is already su¢ ciently advanced
at the time of trade opening.
37Here the assumption that " > (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) ensures that the two inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable to
make Southern scientists prefer, all else equal, to innovate/imitate in the sector that is already more advanced
in the South.
45environmental disaster under autarky but will fail to do so under free trade.
Proof. See Appendix H.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced endogenous directed technical change in a growth model with envi-
ronmental constraints and limited resources. We characterized the structure of equilibria and
the dynamic tax policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare.
Both the long-run properties of the equilibrium and optimal policies (or the necessary policies to
avoid environmental disasters) are related to the degree of substitutability or complementarity
between clean and dirty inputs, to whether dirty input production uses exhaustible resources,
to initial environmental and resource stocks, and to cross-country technological spillovers.
Our analysis implies that factoring in directed technical change: (i) increases the cost of
delaying intervention, particularly in the substitutability case; (ii) calls for the use of pro￿t
taxes or other instruments to direct innovation, in addition to the input tax emphasized so far
by the literature. Moreover we showed that: (i) in the case where the clean and dirty inputs
are substitutes, one can achieve sustainable long-run growth with temporary taxation of dirty
innovation and production; (ii) the sooner and stronger the policy response, the shorter the
slow growth transition phase; (iii) the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty goods production
helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire when the two inputs are substitute,
but the opposite holds when the two inputs are complements. A simple calibration of our
model suggests that, provided that elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty inputs is
su¢ ciently high, optimal environmental regulation should involve an immediate switch of R&D
resources to clean technology, followed by essentially all production switching to clean inputs.
This conclusion appears robust to the range of discount rates used in the Stern report and
in Nordhaus￿ s work (which lead to very di⁄erent policy conclusions in models with exogenous
technology).
We also used our basic framework to investigate issues of global policy coordination. In a
two-country extension where: (a) the two inputs are substitutable in both countries; (b) dirty
input production in both countries depletes the global environmental stock; (c) the South
imitates technologies invented in the North, then taxing dirty innovation and production in
the North only, may be su¢ cient to avoid a global disaster; however, this is less likely to be
true if free trade is allowed between North and South, since in that case taxing the North only
may induce full specialization by the South in dirty input production.
Our paper is a ￿rst step towards a comprehensive framework that can be used for theoretical
and quantitative analysis of environmental regulation with endogenous technology. Several
directions of future research appear fruitful. First, it would be useful to develop a more detailed
46multi-country model with endogenous technology and environmental constraints, which can be
used to discuss issues of global policy coordination and the degree to which international trade
should be linked to environmental policies. Second, an interesting direction is to incorporate
￿environmental risk￿into this framework, for example, because of the ex ante uncertainty on
the regeneration rate, ￿, or on the initial environmental quality, S0. Another line of important
future research would be to exploit macroeconomic and microeconomic (￿rm- and industry-
level) data to estimate the relevant elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty inputs.
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51Appendix A: Equilibrium allocations of scientists
In this Appendix, we characterize the equilibrium allocation(s) of innovation e⁄ort across the
two sectors and provide a proof of Lemma 1. To illustrate the role of Assumption 1 more clearly,
we relax this assumption for now (this assumption is imposed throughout the text). Recall
that at time t, the ratio of expected pro￿ts from undertaking research in clean technologies
over the expected pro￿ts from undertaking research in dirty technologies is given by (20) in the
text. The characterization and the proof of Lemma 1 will follow by considering three cases.
1. Innovation can occur in the clean sector only (i.e., it could be an equilibrium for innova-
tion to be only in the clean sector, which equivalently implies sdt = 1 and sct = 0). This
applies when
￿c
￿d
(1 + ￿￿c)
￿’￿1
￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
￿ 1;
which follows from (20) by using the fact that sdt = 1 and sct = 0. This condition is also
equivalent to
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
(1 + ￿￿c)
￿(’+1)
’ when " > 1
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
(1 + ￿￿c)
￿(’+1)
’ when " < 1:
2. Innovation can occur in the dirty sector only. With the same reasoning as in the previous
case,this applies when
￿c
￿d
￿
1
1 + ￿￿dsdt
￿￿’￿1 ￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
￿ 1
or equivalently, when:
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
(1 + ￿￿d)
’+1
’ when " > 1
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
(1 + ￿￿d)
’+1
’ when " < 1:
3. Finally innovation can occur in both sectors if
￿c
￿d
￿
1 + ￿￿csct
1 + ￿￿dsdt
￿￿’￿1 ￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
= 1:
If " = 2￿￿
1￿￿ (that is, if ’+1 = 0), this equality holds if and only if
￿c
￿d
￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
= 1, in
which case any sct is an equilibrium allocation of scientists.
52If " 6= 2￿￿
1￿￿, the only possible candidate equilibrium with scientists directing research
towards both sectors must have the share of scientists working in the clean sector as:
sct =
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’+1 ￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
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’+1 ￿
Act￿1
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’+1 ￿￿d + ￿￿c
:
If this value is strictly between 0 and 1, then the candidate equilibrium would be an
actual equilibrium. This in turn requires:
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.
This leads to following characterization of equilibrium innovation allocations between the
two sectors:
￿ Suppose " > 2￿￿
1￿￿. If
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then innovation occurs only in the clean sector or only in the dirty sector. If (1 + ￿￿c)
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Finally, if
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53then innovation occurs in both sectors with
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This characterization also shows that when " > 2￿￿
1￿￿, there may be multiple equilibria but
when " < 2￿￿
1￿￿, the equilibrium is always uniquely de￿ned. Nevertheless, under Assumption 1,
even when " > 2￿￿
1￿￿, the equilibrium is unique, since
Act￿1
Adt￿1 < (1 + ￿￿c)
￿
’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’. Lemma 1
then follows directly from this characterization and Assumption 1. ￿
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider the cases where the two inputs are gross substitutes (" > 1) and complements
(" < 1) separately.
Case " > 1: Assumption 1 together with the characterization of equilibrium allocation of
scientists in Appendix A implies that initially innovation will occurs in the dirty sector only
(sdt = 1 and sct = 0). From (15), this widens the gap between clean and dirty technologies and
ensures that sdt+1 = 1 and sct+1 = 0, and so on in subsequent periods. This shows that under
Assumption 1, the equilibrium is uniquely de￿ned under laissez-faire and involves sdt = 1 and
sct = 0 for all t.
Case " < 1: In this case the result follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When " < 1, long-run equilibrium innovation will be in both sectors so that the
equilibrium share of scientists in the clean sector converges to sc =
￿d
￿c+￿d:
Proof. Suppose that at time t innovation occurred in both sectors so that ￿ct
￿dt = 1: Then
￿ct+1
￿dt+1
=
￿c
￿d
￿
1 + ￿￿csct+1
1 + ￿￿dsdt+1
￿￿’￿1 ￿
Act
Adt
￿￿’
=
￿
1 + ￿￿csct+1
1 + ￿￿dsdt+1
￿￿’￿1 ￿
1 + ￿￿csct
1 + ￿￿dsdt
￿
54Innovation will then occur in both sectors at time t + 1 whenever the equilibrium allocation
of scientists (sct+1;sdt+1) at time t + 1 is such that
1 + ￿￿csct+1
1 + ￿￿dsdt+1
=
￿
1 + ￿￿csct
1 + ￿￿dsdt
￿ 1
’+1
: (50)
This equation de￿nes sct+1 = 1 ￿ sdt+1 as a function of sct = 1 ￿ sdt: We next claim that
this equation has an interior solution sct+1 2 (0;1) when sct2 (0;1) (i.e., when sct+1 is itself
interior). First, note that when ’ > 0 (that is, " < 1), the function z(x) = x
1
’+1 ￿x is strictly
decreasing for x < 1 and strictly increasing for x > 1. Therefore, x = 1 is the unique positive
solution to z(x) = 0. Second, note also that the function
X(sct) =
1 + ￿￿csct
1 + ￿￿dsdt
=
1 + ￿￿csct
1 + ￿￿d(1 ￿ sct)
;
is a one-to-one mapping from (0;1) onto ( 1
1+￿￿d;1 + ￿￿c). Finally, it can be veri￿ed that
whenever X 2 ( 1
1+￿￿d;1 + ￿￿c), we also have X
1
’+12 ( 1
1+￿￿d;1 + ￿￿c). This, together with
(50), implies that if sct 2 (0;1), then sct+1 = X￿1(X(sct)
1
’+1) 2 (0;1), proving the claim at
the beginning of this paragraph.
From Appendix A we know that when ’ > 0; the equilibrium allocation of scientists is
unique at each t. Thus as t ! 1, this allocation must converge to the unique ￿xed point of
the function Z(s) = X￿1 ￿ (X(s))
1
’+1, which is
sc =
￿d
￿c + ￿d
:
This complete the proof of the lemma.
Now given the characterization of the equilibrium allocations of scientists in Appendix
A, under Assumption 1 the equilibrium involves sdt = 0 and sct = 1, i.e., innovation occurs
initially in the clean sector only. From (15), Act=Adt will grow at a rate ￿￿c, and in ￿nite
time, it will exceed the threshold (1 + ￿￿c)
￿
’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’. Lemma 2 implies that when this ratio
is in the interval
￿
(1 + ￿￿c)
￿
’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’ ;
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’ (1 + ￿￿d)
’+1
’
￿
￿c
￿d
￿ 1
’
￿
; equilibrium innovation
occurs in both sectors, i.e., sdt > 0 and sct > 0. Therefore, from the time the critical threshold
is exceeded, innovation will occur in both sectors and the share of scientists devoted to the
clean sector converges to
￿d
￿d+￿c. This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ￿
Appendix C: Proof of Corollary 1
From the expressions in (21), dirty input production is given by:
Ydt =
￿
A
’
ct + A
’
dt
￿￿
￿+’
’ A
￿+’
ct Adt =
Adt
￿
1 +
￿
Adt
Act
￿’￿ ￿+’
’
:
When the two inputs are gross substitutes (" < 1), we have ’ = ’su < 0; whereas when
they are complements (" > 1), we have ’ = ’co > 0 . Since all innovations occur in the dirty
55sector in the substitutability case, but not in the complementarity case, if we start with the
same levels of technologies in both cases, at any time t > 0 we have Asu
dt > Aco
dt and Asu
ct < Aco
ct;
where Asu
kt and Aco
kt denote the average productivities in sector k at time t respectively in the
substitutability and in the complementarity case, starting from the same initial productivities
Asu
k0 = Aco
k0.
Under Assumption 1, we have
￿
Asu
dt
Asu
ct
￿’su
<
￿d
￿c
￿
￿
Aco
dt
Aco
ct
￿’co
so that
Y su
dt =
Asu
dt ￿
1 +
￿
ASu
dt
Asu
ct
￿’su￿ ￿
’su +1
>
Asu
ct ￿
1 +
￿
Aco
ct
Aco
dt
￿’co￿
 
1 +
￿
ASu
dt
Asu
ct
￿’su!￿ ￿
’su
>
Asu
ct ￿
1 +
￿
Aco
ct
Aco
dt
￿’co￿
>
Asu
ct
￿
1 +
￿
Aco
ct
Aco
dt
￿’c0￿ ￿
’c0
+1
> Y co
dt:
Repeating the same argument for t + 1, t + 2,..., we have that Y su
dt > Y co
dt for all t. This
establishes that, under Assumption 1, there will be a greater amount of dirty input production
for each t when " > 1 than when " < 1, implying that an environmental disaster will occur
sooner when the two sectors are gross substitutes, as claimed in the corollary. ￿
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 7
We ￿rst derive the expression for ￿t as a function of Act, Adt, !t+1 and ￿t. Using (27), we
have
p1￿"
ct + (pdt (1 + ￿t))
1￿" = 1 (51)
(which is just stating that pct and pdt are the prices of the two inputs relative to the ￿nal
good, which is chosen as the numeraire). Since, as in the laissez-faire equilibrium, the value of
marginal product of labor must be equated in the two sectors, we have
p
1
1￿￿
ct Act = p
1
1￿￿
dt Adt: (52)
56Next, (51) combined with (52) leads to the following expression for the equilibrium (pre-tax)
price of the dirty input
pdt =
A1￿￿
ct
￿
A
’
ct (1 + ￿t)
1￿" + A
’
dt
￿ 1
1￿"
; (53)
which is decreasing in the tax rate ￿t (whereas the post-tax price is increasing in ￿t). Similarly,
the price of the clean input is given by
pct =
A1￿￿
dt
￿
A
’
ct (1 + ￿t)
1￿" + A
’
dt
￿ 1
1￿"
; (54)
This tax rate is then uniquely given by:
￿1￿"
t =
￿
!t+1￿
￿t
￿1￿"
0
@1 +
 
A1￿￿
dt
(1 + ￿t)A1￿￿
ct
!1￿"1
A:
In the text we have already shown how the monopoly distortion can be corrected for using
a subsidy on the use of machines. To complete the proof of Proposition 7, we simply need to
show that, given this subsidy and the input tax, the appropriate pro￿t tax can implement the
optimal allocation of scientists. Using (25) in (27), combined with (52), we ￿nd that
Lct
Ldt
= (1 + ￿t)
"
￿
Act
Adt
￿￿’
; (55)
which implies that a higher tax induces greater relative employment in the clean sector.
Next, incorporating the subsidy to the use of machines, we have
xjit =
￿
￿
 
pjt
￿ 1
1￿￿
AjitLjt; (56)
so that pre-tax pro￿ts are
￿jit = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
p
1
1￿￿
jt AjitLjt:
Then, under a pro￿t tax of qt on pro￿ts in sector d; the ratio of expected pro￿ts from
innovation in sectors c and d, the equivalent of (20) becomes
￿ct
￿dt
=
￿c
￿d
￿
1 + ￿￿csct
1 + ￿￿dsdt
￿￿’￿1 (1 + ￿t)
"
(1 ￿ qt)
￿
Act￿1
Adt￿1
￿￿’
:
An identical argument to that in Lemma 1 implies that innovation at time t occurs in the
clean sector only when ￿ct
￿dt > 1, in the dirty sector only when ￿ct
￿dt < 1, and it may occur in
both when ￿ct
￿dt = 1. Thus with qt su¢ ciently high, the unique equilibrium involves sct = 1 and
sdt = 0. More speci￿cally,
qt ￿ 1 ￿
￿c
￿d
(1 + ￿￿d)
’+1 (1 + ￿t)
"
￿
Adt￿1
Act￿1
￿’
is su¢ cient for the unique equilibrium (even when " ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)) to involve sct = 1 and
sdt = 0. This establishes Proposition 7. ￿
57Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 8
Using (7), (25), (53), (54), and (55), we obtain the optimal production of each input at time
t as:
Yct =
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿ (1 + ￿t)
" ActA
￿+’
dt ￿
A
’
dt + (1 + ￿t)
1￿" A
’
ct
￿ ￿
’ ￿
A
’
ct + (1 + ￿t)
" A
’
dt
￿ (57)
Ydt =
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿ A
￿+’
ct Adt
￿
A
’
dt + (1 + ￿t)
1￿" A
’
ct
￿ ￿
’ ￿
A
’
ct + (1 + ￿t)
" A
’
dt
￿ (58)
so that the production of dirty input is decreasing in ￿t. Moreover, clearly Ydt ! 0 as ￿t ! 1.
Strong substitutability case: Assume " > (1 ￿ ￿)￿1. The proof involves three steps:
1. We show that a policy where Yct remains bounded cannot be optimal when the discount
rate is su¢ ciently low
2. We show that if Yct becomes unbounded while Ydt is bounded, Yct must goes to in￿nity
over time
3. We prove that the optimal policy involves a switch towards clean innovation only in ￿nite
time
First Step: To avoid a disaster it is necessary that Ydt does not increase without bound
over time (Ydt ￿ (1 + ￿)S=￿ )
Consider ￿rst a policy that does not involve a permanent switch from dirty to clean
production, that is, a policy where Yct remains bounded so that Yt must remain bounded as
well and thus so does Ct . We use the superscript ns (ns for "no switch") to denote the
economic variables under this policy.
Now, consider an alternative policy which features a switch towards clean innovation only.
Then as " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), in the long-run Ydt decreases to 0 in ￿nite time. Thus St reaches S
in ￿nite time and therefore in the long-run Yt and Ct grow like Act . We use superscript a to
denote economic variables under this alternative policy.
So there exists some time T and some consumption level C and some ￿ > 0 , such that
for t ￿ T , consumption under the alternative policy keeps growing and is above C + ￿
while consumption under the no switch policy remains below C , and also by that time the
environmental quality under the alternative policy has reached S.
Note then that for t ￿ T
u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t ) ￿ u
￿
Ca
t ;S
￿
￿ u
￿
C;S
￿
which is positive and increasing in t.
58Now
Wa ￿ Wns =
T￿1 X
t=0
1
(1 + ￿)
t (u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t )) +
1 X
t=T
1
(1 + ￿)
t (u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t ))
￿
T￿1 X
t=0
1
(1 + ￿)
t (u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t )) +
1
(1 + ￿)
T
1 X
t=T
1
(1 + ￿)
t￿T
￿
u
￿
Ca
t ;S
￿
￿ u
￿
C;S
￿￿
:
As ￿ becomes arbitrarily small the ￿rst sum is bounded below. If on the other hand,
u
￿
Ca
t ;S
￿
￿ u
￿
C;S
￿
is positive and increases without bound, then the second sum increases
without bound when ￿ decreases. So for ￿ su¢ ciently low Wa ￿ Wns is necessarily positive:
welfare is higher under the alternative policy than under the no switch policy.
Now if on the contrary u
￿
C;S
￿
is bounded in C ,
u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t ) ￿ u
￿
C + ￿;S
￿
￿ u
￿
C;S
￿
and
Wa ￿ Wns =
T￿1 X
t=0
1
(1 + ￿)
t (u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t )) +
1 X
t=T
1
(1 + ￿)
t (u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t ))
￿
T￿1 X
t=0
1
(1 + ￿)
t (u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns
t )) +
1
(1 + ￿)
T
1 X
t=T
1
(1 + ￿)
t￿T
￿
u
￿
C + ￿;S
￿
￿ u
￿
C;S
￿￿
:
When ￿ goes down to 0 the ￿rst sum is bounded below while the second sum increases without
bound. So for ￿ su¢ ciently low Wa ￿ Wns is positive: welfare is higher under the alternative
policy than under the no switch policy.
In both cases a policy where Yct=Ydt remains ￿nite cannot be optimal. This establishes
Step 1.
Second step: We know that under the optimal policy Yct cannot remain bounded over time
whereas Ydt must remain bounded. Let M > (1 + ￿)S=￿ , then on the optimal path there
must exist some t1 and t2 such that Yct1 > kM and Yct2 > kM with t2 > t1 and k is a positive
number. Let us assume that for some periods ￿ between t1 and t2 , Yc￿ < M: Then, since Ydt is
bounded above by (1 + ￿)S=￿, it must be the case that during these periods C￿ is smaller than
2
"
"￿1M, since when Yc￿ < M and Yd￿ < M, we must have C￿ < Y￿ < 2
"
"￿1M. Now consider
an alternative policy that would mimic the previous policy except that whenever Yc￿ < M
under the original policy, the alternative policy induces Yc￿ > (k ￿ 1)M while maintaining
the production of dirty input arbitrarily small. This in turn can be done because when M
is su¢ ciently large, then at time t1 the economy was already mostly relying on the clean
sector (recall that Y =
￿
Y
"￿1
"
c + Y
"￿1
"
d
￿ "
"￿1
, so that if Yc is arbitrarily large compared to Yd
, Yc=Y becomes arbitrarily close to 1 when " > 1). Thus at time t1 it would be possible to
achieve a ￿nal output of at least (k ￿ 1)M while maintaining the production of dirty input
arbitrarily small. As no knowledge is lost over time, what was possible at time t1 remains
possible thereafter, hence it is still possible to achieve a ￿nal output of (k ￿ 1)M with a
59negligible amount of dirty input production at time ￿ > t1 . Now by choosing k su¢ ciently
large we make sure that consumption after t1 is strictly higher than 2
"
"￿1M . Thus, under this
alternative policy, consumption is higher during the time periods where the two policies di⁄er
and the quality of the environment is never lower under the alternative policy. Therefore the
alternative policy beats the original policy, which proves by contradiction that on the optimal
path, it must be the case that Yct remains higher than M between t1 and t2 . Consequently,
Yct must always lie above M after t1 . Since this is true for M arbitrarily large, Yct must grow
to in￿nity over time.
Third step: Recall the equilibrium expressions (57) and (58). Thus when Yct tends towards
in￿nity while Ydt remains bounded, Yct
Ydt =
￿
(1 + ￿t)
￿
Act
Adt
￿1￿￿￿"
must tends towards 1 . But
then we get that in the long-run
Yct ￿
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
Act
and
Ydt ￿
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
A
￿+’
ct A
"(1￿￿)
dt (1 + ￿)
￿" :
Thus
Yt ￿
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
Act
Ct ￿ ￿Act;
where ￿ is a constant.
Thus if some innovation was to be diverted away from the clean sector, the ￿rst order e⁄ect
would be to reduce consumption, while increasing Ydt (as " > (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ), thereby lowering
environmental quality for all subsequent periods. This cannot be optimal, hence we get that
in ￿nite time, all innovation must occur in the clean sector.
As a consequence production of dirty input goes down to 0 in ￿nite time, therefore envi-
ronmental quality converges to S in ￿nite time, and the optimal pro￿t tax and input taxes are
temporary.
Weak substitutability case: If 1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿) , then the input tax must be perma-
nent, otherwise production of dirty input becomes unbounded.
Complementarity case: If " < 1, the growth rate of the economy is the minimum of
the growth rates of the two inputs, but the long-run growth rate of the dirty input must be
zero in order to avoid a disaster, so the optimum does not involve a positive long-run growth
rate. Policy intervention must then be permanent (without policy intervention there will be
positive long-run growth). In fact, in this case both the input tax and the pro￿t tax must be
maintained permanently. Indeed if the input tax were to reach zero after some time T, the
ratio
￿c￿cAct￿1
￿d￿dAdt￿1 would fail to internalize any environmental externality, and would lead to a
pattern of innovation similar to what happens in the laissez-faire case with innovation in both
sectors. But this would lead to a growth rate of ￿e ￿ higher than 0, yielding a contradiction.
This establishes that the input tax cannot reach zero in any ￿nite time T. Similarly, to induce
60the optimal allocation of scientists, the knowledge externality needs to be internalized via a
pro￿t tax/subsidy which also needs to be maintained permanently. This completes the proof
of Proposition 8. ￿
Appendix F: Equilibrium pro￿t ratio with exhaustible resources
We ￿rst analyze how the static equilibrium changes when we introduce the limited resource
constraint. Thus here we drop subscript t for notational simplicity. The description of clean
sectors remains exactly as before. Pro￿t maximization by producers of machines in the dirty
sector now leads to the equilibrium price pdi =
 
￿1 (as ￿1 is the share of machines in the
production of dirty input). The equilibrium output level for machines is then given by:
xdi =
 
(￿1)
2 pdR￿2Ld
1￿￿
 
! 1
1￿￿1
Adi (59)
Pro￿t maximization by the dirty input producer leads to the following demand equation
for the resource:
pd￿2R￿2￿1L1￿￿
d
Z 1
0
A
1￿￿1
di x
￿1
di di = c(Q)
Plugging in the equilibrium output level of machines (59) yields:
R =
 
(￿1)
2
 
! ￿1
1￿￿ ￿
￿2Ad
c(Q)
￿ 1￿￿1
1￿￿
p
1
1￿￿
d Ld (60)
which in turn, together with (34), leads to the following expression for the equilibrium pro-
duction of dirty input:
Yd =
 
(￿1)
2
 
! ￿1
1￿￿ ￿
￿2Ad
c(Q)
￿ ￿2
1￿￿
p
￿
1￿￿
d LdAd: (61)
The equilibrium pro￿ts from producing machine i in the dirty sector becomes:
￿di = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿
1+￿1
1￿￿1
1
￿
1
 ￿1
￿ 1
1￿￿1
p
1
1￿￿1
d R
￿2
1￿￿1 L
1￿￿
1￿￿1
d Adi:
The production of the clean input and the pro￿ts of the producer of machine i in the clean
sector are still given by (18), that is:
Yc =
￿
￿2
 
pc
￿ ￿
1￿￿
LcAc (62)
61and pro￿ts from producing machines ci are
￿ci = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
1+￿
1￿￿
￿
1
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
p
1
1￿￿
c LcAci:
Next, labor market clearing requires that the marginal product of labor be equalized
across sectors; this, together with (61) and (62), leads to the equilibrium price ratio (36): thus
a higher extraction cost will bid up the price of the dirty input. Pro￿t maximization by ￿nal
good producer still yields (10) which, combined with (36), (61) and (62) yields the equilibrium
labor share (equation (37)). Hence, the higher the extraction cost, the higher the amount of
labor allocated to the clean industry when " > 1, but the opposite holds when " < 1.
The ratio of expected pro￿ts from undertaking innovation at time t in the clean versus the
dirty sector, is then equal to (we reintroduce the time subscript):
￿ct
￿dt
=
￿c
￿d
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿
1+￿1
1￿￿1
1
￿
1
 ￿1
￿ 1
1￿￿1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
1+￿
1￿￿
￿
1
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
p
1
1￿￿
ct Lct
p
1
1￿￿1
dt R
￿2
1￿￿1
t L
1￿￿
1￿￿1
dt
Act￿1
Adt￿1
= ￿
￿c
￿d
c(Qt)￿2("￿1) (1 + ￿￿csct)
￿’￿1 A
￿’
ct￿1
(1 + ￿￿dsdt)
￿’1￿1 A
￿’1
dt￿1
where we let ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)￿
(1￿￿1)￿
1+￿2￿￿1
1￿￿1
1
￿
￿2￿
 ￿2￿
2￿1
1 ￿
￿2
2
￿("￿1)
: This establishes (38). ￿
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 11
First, we derive the equilibrium production of R and Yd.
Using both, the fact that the ￿nal good is chosen as numeraire and the expression for the
equilibrium price ratio (36), we get:
pc =
 ￿2 (￿1)
2￿1 (￿2)
￿2 A
1￿￿1
d
￿
(￿2￿c(Q)
￿2)
1￿" A
’
c +
￿
 ￿2 (￿1)
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A
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￿2 A1￿￿
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A
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1￿"
Similarly, using the expression for the equilibrium labor ratio (37), and labor market
clearing (7), we obtain:
Ld =
￿
c(Q)￿2￿2￿￿(1￿") A
’
c
(c(Q)￿2￿2￿)
(1￿") A
’
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 ￿2￿
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1 (￿2)
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A
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d
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Next, using the above expressions for equilibrium prices and labor allocation, and plugging
them in (61) and (60), we obtain:
Yd =
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1
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;
so that:
R
Yd
=
￿2￿2￿ (c(Q))
￿2￿1
￿
(￿2￿c(Q)
￿2)
1￿" +
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 ￿2 (￿1)
2￿1 (￿2)
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A
’
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:
In the remaining part of the proof, we again separately consider the case in which the two
inputs are complements and the case where they are substitutes.
Substitutability case: When " > 1, production of the dirty input is not essential to ￿nal
good production. Thus, even if the stock of exhaustible resource gets fully depleted, it is still
possible to achieve positive long-run growth. For a disaster to occur for any initial value of the
environmental quality, it is necessary that Yd grow at a positive rate while R must converge
to 0: This implies that R=Yd must converge to 0. This in turn means that the expression
￿
￿2￿c(Q)
￿2￿1￿" +
￿
 ￿2 (￿1)
2￿1 (￿2)
￿2
￿1￿" A
’1
d
A
’
c
must be equal to zero, which is impossible since c(Q) is bounded above. Therefore, for su¢ -
ciently high initial quality of the environment, a disaster will be avoided.
Next, one can show that innovation will always end up occurring in the clean sector only.
This is obvious if the resource gets depleted in ￿nite time, so let us consider the case where it
never gets depleted. The ratio of expected pro￿ts in clean versus dirty innovation is given by
￿ct
￿dt
= ￿
￿c
￿d
c(Qt)￿2("￿1) (1 + ￿￿csct)
￿’￿1 A
￿’
ct￿1
(1 + ￿￿dsdt)
￿’1￿1 A
￿’1
dt￿1
;
so that to prevent innovation from occurring asymptotically in the clean sector only it must be
the case that A
￿’
c does not grow faster then A
￿’1
dt . In this case R = O
￿
A
1￿￿1
1￿￿
d
￿
: But A
1￿￿1
1￿￿
d
grows at a positive rate over time, so that the resource gets depleted in ￿nite time after all.
63Complementarity case: When " < 1, Yd is now essential for production and thus so is
the resource ￿ ow R. Consequently, it is necessary that Q does not get depleted in ￿nite time in
order to get positive long-run growth. Recall that innovation takes place in both sectors if and
only if ￿
￿c
￿d
c(Qt)￿2("￿1)(1+￿￿csct)￿’￿1A
￿’
ct￿1
(1+￿￿dsdt)￿’1￿1A
￿’1
dt￿1
= 1, and positive long-run growth requires positive
growth of both dirty input and clean input productions. This requires that innovation occurs
in both sectors, so A
(1￿￿1)
d and A
(1￿￿)
c should be of same order.
But then:
R = O
￿
A
1￿￿1
1￿￿
d
￿
;
so that R grows over time. But this in turn leads to the resource stock being fully exhausted
in ￿nite time, thereby also shutting down the production of dirty input, which here prevents
positive long-run growth. This completes the proof of Proposition 11. ￿
Appendix H: Proof of Propositions 15 and 16
Proof of Proposition 15: Assume that the South operates under laissez-faire, whereas the
North is subject to some environmental policy
￿
￿N
t ;qN
t
￿
where ￿N
t ￿ 0, and the policy implies
that at all point in time innovation occurs in the clean sector only in the North. North and
South can freely trade the clean and dirty inputs (equation (47) is satis￿ed - which allows us
to drop the superscript k for the price pk
c-). The global economy must satisfy labor market
clearing in both countries
Lk
c + Lk
d = Lk, for k = N;S; (63)
as well as trade balance:
pc
￿
Y k
c ￿ f Y k
c
￿
+ pS
d
￿
Y k
d ￿ f Y k
d
￿
= 0; (64)
(where f Y k
j denotes the consumption of input j in country k) and global market clearing for
both input markets:
Y N
j + Y S
j = g Y N
j + f Y S
j : (65)
What we need to show now is: ￿rst, that a disaster remains unavoidable under free
trade when 1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿) no matter the initial environmental quality; second, that when
" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿) a disaster may not be avoided any more under free trade even with an arbitrarily
large S.
The proof proceeds in four steps:
1. We describe the set of possible equilibria when the South has a comparative advantage
in the production of the dirty input
2. We show that when ￿ + ’ > 0 , avoiding a disaster requires that the South has a
comparative advantage in dirty input production.
3. Using steps 1 and 2, we prove that when ￿+’ > 0 , it is not possible to avoid a disaster
under free trade either.
644. We derive explicit conditions under which redirecting innovation towards the clean sector
in the North only, prevents a disaster under autarky but no longer under free trade in
one equilibrium.
STEP 1
Lemma 3 Assuming that the South has a comparative advantage in the production of dirty
input, then in equilibrium the global economy will feature:
￿ If LN
LS > (AN
d )
’
(AN
c )
’
(1+￿N)
"+ ￿
1￿￿ AS
d
AN
d
, non complete specialization in the North and complete
specialization in dirty input production in the South
￿ If (AS
d)
’
(AS
c )
’
AS
c
AN
c ￿ LN
LS ￿ (AN
d )
’
(AN
c )
’
(1+￿N)
"+ ￿
1￿￿ AS
d
AN
d
complete specialization in clean input produc-
tion in the North and in dirty input production in the South
￿ If LN
LS <
￿
AS
d
AS
c
￿’ AS
c
AN
c complete specialization in clean input production in the North and
non complete specialization in the South
Proof. We consider each of these three cases in turn and derive necessary conditions for
them to arise in equilibrium:
Case 1: incomplete specialization in the North, complete specialization in the
South
In this case all labor in the South is devoted to the production of dirty input. Equation
(45) and equalization of the MPL across sectors in the North leads to:
pc
pN
d
=
￿
AN
d
AN
c
￿(1￿￿)
From this we can express the equilibrium price levels as:
pc =
￿
AN
d
￿(1￿￿)
￿￿
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d
￿’ + (1 + ￿N)
1￿" (AN
c )
’
￿ 1
1￿"
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￿
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1￿" (AN
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￿ 1
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Final good producer maximization then implies:
g Y N
c
g Y N
d
=
f Y S
c
f Y S
d
=
￿
pc
pS
d
￿￿"
=
￿
1 + ￿N￿"
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c
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(66)
65Finally, (65), (63) and (64) yield the equilibrium allocation of labor between the two sectors:38
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Non complete specialization in the North then imposes that LN
d > 0 , which in turn is equivalent
to:
LN
LS >
￿
AN
d
￿’
(AN
c )
’
￿
1 + ￿N￿"+ ￿
1￿￿ AS
d
AN
d
: (67)
Case 2: complete specialization in both countries
Here, all labor in the South is allocated to the production of dirty input, and all labor
in the North is allocated to the production of the clean input. This yields equation (49).
Complete specialization in clean production in the North then requires
MPLN
c
MPLN
d
￿ 1; whereas
complete specialization in dirty production in the South requires
MPLS
c
MPLS
d
￿ 1: Finally, pro￿t
maximization by the ￿nal good producer yields the equilibrium price ratio:
pc
pS
d
=
 
f Y k
c
f Y k
d
!￿ 1
"
for k = N;S: (68)
38Equations (64) and (66) yield the follwing expressions for the equilibrium input levels:
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now using this expression together with (65) and (18) leads to
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from which we can infer the equilibrium allocation of labor between the two sectors..
66This, together with (64), yields the following expression for the consumption of input j in
country k :
f Y k
d =
pcY k
c + pdY k
d
p1￿"
c p"
d + pd
;
and, together with (65), we obtain the equilibrium price levels:
pc =
￿
AS
dLS￿ 1
"+ ￿
1￿￿
￿￿
AS
dLS￿ 1￿"
"+ ￿
1￿￿ + (AN
c LN)
1￿"
"+ ￿
1￿￿
￿ 1
1￿"
pS
d =
￿
AN
c LN￿ 1
"+ ￿
1￿￿
￿
￿
AS
dLS￿ 1￿"
"+ ￿
1￿￿ + (AN
c LN)
1￿"
"+ ￿
1￿￿
￿ 1
1￿"
(69)
Substituting for these equilibrium input price in the condition
MPLN
c
MPLN
d
￿ 1; implies that:
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and similarly substituting for the equilibrium input price in the condition
MPLS
c
MPLS
d
￿ 1; implies
that:
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Using (49) and (69), we can derive the equilibrium input production in the South, namely:
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Case 3: complete specialization in the North, non complete specialization in
the South
The analysis is completely symmetric to that in case 1. We can derive the following
expression for the equilibrium allocation of labor between the two sectors in the South:
LS
d =
￿
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c
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AN
c
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c LN
￿
(AS
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￿’ (73)
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so that this case scenario is possible only if
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:
67We can then compute the equilibrium dirty input production level as
Y S
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(75)
The argument so far establishes that as long as the South has a comparative advantage in the
dirty input production, the above conditions do not overlap, hence they are not only necessary
but also su¢ cient. This complete the proof of lemma.
STEP 2
Lemma 4 When ￿+’ > 0 any policy in the North aimed at avoiding a disaster would involve
the South having a comparative advantage in dirty input production in the long-run.
Proof. Suppose that the North had a comparative advantage in dirty input production
in long-run. Then it would produce more dirty input for given taxes and technology under
free-trade than in autarky. Under autarky, the production of dirty input in the North would be-
come asymptotically proportional to
￿
1 + ￿N
t
￿￿" ￿
AN
ct
￿￿+’ : However, by assumption,
￿
AN
ct
￿￿+’
grows over time, therefore in order to avoid a disaster the government must impose a tax ￿N
t
on dirty input production which increases without bound over time. At the same time, the
fact that the North has a comparative advantage in dirty input production implies that
￿
1 + ￿N
t
￿ 1
1￿￿ AN
ct
AN
dt
<
AS
ct
AS
dt
:
However, the fact that
AN
ct
AS
ct
> 1 whereas
AN
dt
AS
dt
remains bounded above, makes it is impossible for
this inequality to keep being satis￿ed over time meanwhile the tax schedule ￿N
t increases.
Now, suppose that there exists an in￿nite sequence of periods where the South would have
a comparative advantage in clean input production and there exists an in￿nite sequence of
periods where it has a comparative advantage in dirty input production. First, note that in
the long-run imitation must asymptotically occur in the clean sector only. Indeed if imitation
in the dirty sector kept on occurring inde￿nitely over time, then AS
dt would tends towards AN
dt
so it would be impossible to satisfy
￿
1 + ￿N
t
￿ 1
1￿￿ AN
ct
AN
dt
<
AS
ct
AS
dt
even when ￿N
t = 0. Consequently,
in the long-run AS
ct should grow at the same rate as AN
ct . But in periods where the South
has a comparative advantage in dirty input production, its production will become arbitrarily
large over time (this results from equations (75) and (72) and the fact that the condition
to have complete specialization in the South but not in the North cannot hold in the long-
run). Eventually this will lead to a disaster, since total production of dirty input must remain
bounded to avoid a disaster.
Thus it is impossible to avoid a disaster through a policy where the South would not have
a comparative advantage in dirty input production.
STEP 3
Lemma 5 The North cannot prevent a disaster under free trade for any initial environmental
quality when ￿ + ’ > 0.
68Proof. From Lemma 3, we know that the North must have a comparative advantage in
clean input production when ￿+’ > 0 in order to avoid a disaster. Now we use Lemma 4, to
describe the possible long-run scenarios and to show that in each of them the dirty input will
grow positively.
A ￿rst possibility is to end up with complete specialization in the South but production
of both inputs in the North. Indeed as long as the dirty input is the only one produced
in the South, all imitation there occurs in the dirty sector, so AS
ct does not grow over time.
However (AN
d )
’
(AN
c )
’
(1+￿N)
"+ ￿
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d
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’
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which grows exponentially, so the inequality LN
LS ￿
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’
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"+ ￿
1￿￿ AS
d
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d
must be violated at some point. Hence in ￿nite time the economy will
display either complete specialization in both countries case or complete specialization in the
North only.
A second possibility is to end up with complete specialization in both countries. Then,
asymptotically, using equation (72) we of thing that
Y S
d ’
￿
AN
c LN￿ ￿
"(1￿￿)+￿ ￿
AS
dLS￿ "(1￿￿)
"(1￿￿)+￿ ;
so that Y S
d grows exponentially at the strictlypositive rate (1 + ￿￿c)
￿
"(1￿￿)+￿ ￿1. So a disaster
cannot be avoided
A third possibility is to end up with no specialization in the South. Using equation (75),
note that
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dAN
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Now, given that AS
c < AN
c , then Y S
d must at least be of the same order as
￿
AN
c
￿￿+’ which
grows positively. Thus again, a disaster cannot be avoided.
Finally, if the economy moves back and forth between these latter two cases, and given
that in either case the production of dirty input becomes unbounded, the policy cannot be
successful either. This completes the proof.
STEP 4
Lemma 6 If
AS
ct￿1
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, then at time t
there exists an equilibrium where the South has a comparative advantage in dirty technology and
produces only in dirty technology. Moreover,
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Proof. Assume that at time t the South produces the dirty input only. Then all imitation
in the South will be in the dirty input, hence
AS
dt = (1 ￿ ￿d)AS
dt￿1 + ￿dAN
dt￿1:
This in turn implies that
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;
69so that it is indeed an equilibrium to have the South produce the dirty input only. Moreover,
we have
AS
ct
(1 ￿ ￿d)AS
dt + ￿dAN
dt
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Now assume that
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;
which is satis￿ed for AS
c0 su¢ ciently small. Then there will be an equilibrium where the
South always has a comparative advantage in the production of the dirty input and where the
South completely specializes in dirty input production. At some point (AN
d )
’
(AN
c )
’
AS
d
AN
d
will become
su¢ ciently large that complete specialization must occur in equilibrium in the South. But
then dirty input production is asymptotically equal to
￿
AN
c LN￿ ￿
"(1￿￿)+￿ ￿
AS
dLS￿ "(1￿￿)
"(1￿￿)+￿ ; so
that Y S
d will keep increasing at rate (1 + ￿￿c)
￿
"(1￿￿)+￿ ￿ 1. Thus in this case no matter the
initial environmental quality, production of dirty input will keep increasing at a exponential
rate over time leading for sure to a disaster. ￿
Proof of Proposition 16: We now consider an equilibrium where the North always
directs all its research e⁄orts towards the clean technologies and puts a tax ￿N
t ￿ 0 on the
production of dirty input, such that its production of dirty input under autarky is negligible.
We also suppose that ’ + 1 < 0 or equivalently " > (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿).
The proof proceeds in four steps:
1. We show that under the condition on initial level of productivities,
AN
ct
AN
dt
>
AS
ct
AS
dt
at all points
in time, so that the North has a comparative advantage in clean input production.
2. We show that if the North produced only a negligible amount of dirty input under
autarky, it must completely specialize in clean input production under free trade, so that
world production of dirty input must be higher under free trade than under autarky.
3. We move one step back and compare the incentive to imitate in the South in clean
technologies versus dirty technologies with free trade and without free trade
4. We show that the global production of dirty input is at least as high when one takes into
account how opening up to trade modi￿es the dynamic response in the South as when
one does not, so we conclude that the level of environmental quality is lower under free
trade than under autarky
70STEP 1
We want to show that if
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, then at all points in time we have:
AN
ct
AS
ct
>
AN
dt
AS
dt
.
Given that the North devotes all its innovation e⁄orts towards clean technologies, AN
dt remains
constant, and therefore
AN
dt
AS
dt
is non increasing over time. Now, note that AS
ct is smaller or equal
to what it would be if imitation had always occurred in clean technologies in the South. If
imitation indeed occurs in the clean sector only in the South, the law of motion for AS
ct is given
by
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so that
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;
which is what we wanted to prove. As a consequence, no matter the tax policy in the North,
the North keeps its comparative advantage in clean input production.
STEP 2
Under autarky, the expression for dirty input production in the North is given by
Y
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Now assume that the condition (67) is satis￿ed, so that according to lemma 3 the economy will
feature complete specialization in the North but not in the South. Then, using the fact that
AN
d is constant, that AN
c is increasing and that AS
d is non decreasing over time, production of
71dirty input under autarky will satisfy:
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Thus, for a quality of the environment which is su¢ ciently low that the North would not want
to produce as much dirty input as in autarky, this inequality cannot hold: the North must
completely specialize in clean input production. So, we just need to check whether for given
technologies, the world production of dirty input is higher than under autarky in equilibria
that feature complete specialization in both countries or non complete specialization in the
South.
Case of complete specialization in both countries
Dirty input production is then given by equation (72), while under autarky it was given
by equation (21)
Y
S;aut
d =
￿
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c
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d
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’
:
Now, using the fact that under complete specialization in the South equation (71) must hold,
the di⁄erence between dirty input production in the South under free trade and autarky, must
satisfy:
Y
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Thus, provided that under autarky the North would not have produced more than this dif-
ference, world production of dirty input must have increased when moving from autarky to
free-trade.
Now, using the fact that ’ + 1 > 0, we see that AS
d is non decreasing over time and
72bounded above by AN
d0 whereas AS
c0 is non decreasing over time, therefore:
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Thus if the quality of the environment is su¢ ciently low that under autarky the North would
not produce more dirty input than (AN
d0)
’+1(AS
c0)
￿
LS
((AS
d0)
’
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’)
￿+’
’
, necessarily world production of dirty
input has increased when moving from autarky to free trade.
Case of non complete specialization in South
Production of dirty input under free trade is then given by equation (75), so that
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;
then, using the fact that the tax reduces the amount produced in the North under autarky
and that at all points in time
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; we get:
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73STEP 3
Under complete specialization the South will always imitate dirty technologies (as there is no
demand for clean technologies).
Now let us consider the case where there is not complete specialization in the South. The
relative incentives to imitate in the dirty versus the clean sector are pinned down by the pro￿t
ratio
￿S
ct
￿S
dt
=
￿c(pS
ct)
1
1￿￿LS
ctAN
ct
￿d(pS
dt)
1
1￿￿LS
dtAN
dt
:
Now, taking into account the fact that the labor share is now given by equations (74) and (73),
we get
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which is identical to equation (43) except for the correction term
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ct
AS
dt
￿’
AN
ctLN
AS
ctLS+AN
ctLN which
tilts imitation more towards the dirty sector under free trade than under autarky for given
technologies.
Now, for ’ + 1 < 0, (that is, " > (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)) the incentive to imitate in dirty
technology at time t is increasing in As
dt￿1 and decreasing in AS
ct￿1. So, for given technologies
the incentive to imitate in dirty technologies, is always higher under free trade than under
autarky. At the same time, the incentive to imitate in dirty technologies is higher the higher
the current productivity of dirty technology and the lower the current productivity of clean
technology: hence at all points, the incentive to imitate in dirty technologies is higher under
free trade than under autarky. Hence AS
dt is higher and AS
ct lower under autarky than under
free trade. So as long as scientists follow the same rule (for instance that of always choosing
an equilibrium with imitation in the clean sector whenever such an equilibrium exists), they
will always end up imitating dirty technologies more under free trade than under autarky.
STEP 4
Under complete specialization in both countries, we use equation (72) to get:
Y
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;
which is increasing in AS
d: Thus, taking into account the dynamic response of imitation in the
South, production of dirty input under free trade is even higher under complete specialization
than before taking this response into account.
Under incomplete specialization, we use equation (75) to get
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74which is increasing in AS
d and decreasing in AS
c , so that in this case as well dirty input pro-
duction is higher once we take into account the dynamic imitation response of the South.
This establishes that the environmental quality is reduced when moving from autarky to
free trade, completing the proof of the propositions. ￿
Appendix I: Characterization of global optimal environmental
policy with no trade case
We now characterize the optimal policy from the point of view of a global social planner inter-
ested in maximizing the sum of the utilities of households in both countries (both given by (1)).
This social planner will choose a dynamic path of ￿nal good production Y k
t , consumption Ck
t ,
intermediary input productions Y k
jt, machines production xk
jit, labor share allocation Lk
jt, sci-
entists allocation sk
jt and quality of machines Ak
jit for each country k = N;S and environmental
quality St to maximize the Social Welfare Function
1 X
t=0
1
(1 + ￿)
t
￿
LNu
￿
CN
t
LN ;St
￿
+ LSu
￿
CS
t
LS ;St
￿￿
under the same constraints as for the baseline model, except that equation (9) becomes (41),
and the productivity growth in the South equation (42).
Thus the maximization problem is very similar to that analyzed in subsection 3.2. One
di⁄erence is that the shadow value of an environmental unit, which is identical in the two
countries, now includes the marginal bene￿t to the utility of households in both countries so
that:
!t =
1
(1 + ￿)
t
￿
LN @uN
@S
+ LS@uS
@S
￿
+ (1 + ￿)!t+1:
The social planner will still introduce a wedge !t+1￿=￿k
t between the price of the dirty
input and its marginal product in the production of the ￿nal good. This wedge has the same
interpretation as in the one country case; and thus it will be the higher (in absolute value) in
the country with the lowest value ￿k
t , that is, the country with the lowest marginal utility of
consumption (the rich country). This wedge translates into an optimal tax on the dirty input
in country k :
￿k
t =
!t+1￿
￿k
dt
=
!t+1￿
￿k
tpk
dt
This expression is identical to that in the one-country case, and one can similarly establish
that the optimal input tax will be temporary if the clean and dirty inputs are su¢ ciently close
substitutes. But in addition, we now obtain the result that the optimal input tax in the North
is higher than in the absence of the South, as ! is increased by the existence of a South.
Now, the comparison between the optimal input tax in the North and the South, is
governed by the implicit expression already given above and derived in Appendix D, namely:
75Proposition 17 The global optimal input tax schedule (￿N
t ;￿S
t ) satis￿es:
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ct
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:
In particular an increase in the relative productivity in the dirty sector in country k
(Ak
dt=Ak
ct ), a decrease in the marginal value of consumption ￿k
t or an increase in the shadow
value of environment !t+1, either of these increases the tax ￿k
t in country k . The second
e⁄ect will push towards a higher tax in the North, whereas (as long as the dirty sector is more
advanced relative to the clean sector in the South than in the North), the ￿rst e⁄ect will push
for a higher tax in the South. Without further assumptions either of these two e⁄ects may
dominate, and in particular if the South lags far behind with respect to productivity in the
clean sector, the dirty input tax may end up being higher in the South.
De￿ne ￿k
jt as the Lagrange multiplier at time t for the growth equation for sector j in
country k . The ￿rst-order condition with respect to AN
jt now gives:
￿N
jt = ￿N
t
￿
￿
 
￿ ￿
1￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
pN
jt
￿ 1
1￿￿ LN
jt +
￿
1 + ￿￿jsN
jt+1
￿
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jt+1 + ￿jsS
jt￿S
jt (76)
In words: the shadow value of one more unit of clean productivity is equal to its marginal
product at time t (corresponding to the ￿rst term), plus its shadow value at time t + 1 times ￿
1 + ￿￿jsN
jt+1
￿
- the rate of productivity growth in the North between t and t + 1- (corre-
sponding to the second term), plus an additional term ￿csS
jt times the value of one unit of
clean productivity in the South. This term did not exist in the closed economy, because it
represents the international knowledge spillover: each additional unit of productivity in sector
j in country N creates ￿csS
jt units of productivity in sector j in country S.39
The optimal allocation of scientists in the South will be governed by the comparison
between the social gains from imitation in clean versus dirty technologies, namely ￿S
ct￿cAN
ct
versus ￿S
dt￿dAN
dt; and in the North it will be governed by the comparison between ￿N
ct￿cAN
ct￿1
and ￿N
dt￿dAN
dt￿1.
This analysis, combined with the same reasoning as for Proposition 8, establishes the
following result (proof omitted):
39The shadow value ￿
S
jt is itself determined by ￿rst order conditions with respect to A
S
jt, which is
￿
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￿
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The interpretation is basically the same as for ￿
N
jt: the shadow value of a unit of clean productivity is equal
to its marginal product at time t, plus 1 ￿ ￿js
S
jt+1 times its shadow value at time t + 1 (￿js
S
jt+1 machines
will adopt the technology in the North at time t + 1: thus, the decision to allocate scientists to imitatation in
clean technologies in the South, is more "short sighted", that is with a higher weight on current pro￿ts, than if
the North did not exist and the South had to innovate without bene￿ting from knowledge spillovers from the
North), here, there is no technological spillover from South to North, hence the absence of a third term on the
RHS of this equation (unlike in the previous equation for ￿
N
jt).
76Proposition 18 The social optimum can be implemented through a combination of pro￿ts
and input taxes both in the North and in the South, and a subsidy to machine consumers (to
remove the monopoly distortion). If " > 1=(1￿￿) and the discount rate is su¢ ciently low, the
optimal environmental taxes are temporary.
6 Appendix J: Perfect competition in the absence of innovation
Here we show how our results are slightly modi￿ed if, instead of having monopoly rights
randomly attributed to ￿entrepreneurs￿when innovation does not occur, machines are pro-
duced competitively. There are two types of machines. Those where innovation occurred at
the beginning of the period are produced monopolistically with demand function xji = xm
ji =
￿
￿2pj
 
￿ 1
1￿￿ LjAji. Those for which innovation failed are produced competitively. In this case,
machines are priced at marginal cost  , which leads to a demand for competitively produced
machines equal to xji = xc
ji =
￿
￿pj
 
￿ 1
1￿￿ LjAji. The number of machines produced under
monopoly, is simply given by ￿jsj (the number of successful innovation).
Hence the equilibrium production of input j is given by
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where sj is the number of scientists employed in clean industries and f Aj =
￿
￿jsj
￿
￿
￿
1￿￿ ￿ 1
￿
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￿
Aj
is the average corrected productivity level in sector j (taking into account that some machines
are produced by monopolists and others are not).
The equilibrium price ratio is now equal to:
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!￿(1￿￿)
;
and the equilibrium labor ratio becomes:
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:
The ratio of expected pro￿ts from innovation in clean versus dirty sector now becomes
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77This yields the modi￿ed lemma:
Lemma 7 In the decentralized equilibrium, innovation at time t can occur in the clean sector
only when ￿cA
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This modi￿ed lemma can then be used to prove the analogs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 in
the text. The results with exhaustible resource can similarly be generalized to this case.
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